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I
INTRODUCTION
Nonaccidental physical injuries children suffer at the hands of their parents
occur along a continuum that ranges from mild to severe. At the outer edges of
this continuum, one might find, on the one hand, a slight swat to the buttocks,
and on the other, a brutal beating. In the United States, the normative
consensus appears to be that outsiders to the family are appropriately
concerned only when the physical injury at issue causes serious harm; any injury
short of a serious one is exclusively “family business.”
Consistent with this consensus, all states’ laws permit the use of
“reasonable” corporal punishment;1 simultaneously, they all prohibit
nonaccidentally inflicted serious injury. The latter is generally denominated
abuse, although some states classify milder but still impermissible injuries as
neglect, or simply “inappropriate discipline.” Thus, being able to distinguish
between reasonable corporal punishment and maltreatment—whether this is
formally denominated abuse or neglect—is critical for the relevant actors:
parents who use corporal punishment as a disciplinary tool, child protective
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1. As used here and throughout this article, the word “reasonable” is a legal term of art meaning
“acceptable.” See infra IIA (setting out examples of corporal punishment legislation using this term). In
law more generally, “reasonableness” describes a range of behavior that society or a particular
community deems “normal” and thus not an appropriate basis for liability, guilt, or action otherwise. Its
corollary in the social sciences is the term “normative,” which is used throughout this article in the
empirical sense, meaning a behavior that is practiced and accepted by a significant proportion (that is,
at least a quarter) of the population or subgroup at issue. See also infra note 8 (explaining the
relationship between scientific normativeness and cultural and legal norms, including in particular
parental autonomy norms).
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services (CPS) staff who are required by statute to intervene in the family to
protect children subject to or at risk of abuse, and courts adjudicating issues
arising in connection with these cases. The integrity of the distinction and of the
methodology employed to make it is also critical for a society that is
prominently committed to both family autonomy and child welfare, and in
particular to protecting the integrity of the family when it promotes (or at least
does not harm) child welfare, and to intervening in the family when it fails in its
related obligations.
Unfortunately, few if any states have sufficiently defined the relevant terms
“reasonable corporal punishment” or “maltreatment” (abuse or neglect) to
consistently guide the relevant actors (those in a single system) in their
exercises of discretion; nor have they established a coherent methodology for
sorting injuries along the continuum of nonaccidental physical injuries. That
administrative regulations and policies promulgated by state and local CPS
departments often narrow agency discretion helps CPS itself to be more
consistent and may help families know what to expect when they are dealing
with CPS. But because appellate courts do not appear to give much deference
to agency interpretations of the statutory definitions, these regulations and
policies do little to guide the courts’ own exercise of discretion. Moreover, to
the extent that the law in statutes and judicial opinions is either less precise or
even different from the law as it is applied by CPS, the public and parents are
inevitably confused or misled. As a result, decisionmaking about whether an
injury or incident remains in the realm of family business or has crossed the line
into the impermissible varies, reflecting a multiplicity of purely personal
viewpoints, religious and political ideologies, and academic or disciplinary
training and requirements. In turn, institutional treatment of and outcomes for
children and families are often inconsistent.2
The status quo has been defended or at least explained on several grounds.
The vagueness of abuse definitions has been consistently upheld on policy
grounds—specifically on the argument that it is important for authorities to
retain flexibility to call injuries as they see them given that, particularly in a
diverse society, abuse might appear in unexpected forms.3 The difficulty of the

2. Scott A. Davidson, When is Parental Discipline Child Abuse? The Vagueness of Child Abuse
Laws, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 403, 403 (1995–1996) (“[T]he broad language of much of the
legislation provides little guidance in situations in which the child’s punishment is closer to reasonable
parental discipline. As a result, courts apply child abuse laws inconsistently in borderline cases.”); id. at
412 (noting that “parents who desire to obey the [vague] statute[s] could have difficulty in
understanding whether it prohibits their method of abuse”); id. at 414–15 (“[V]ague child abuse
statutes create uncertainty in the minds of mandated reporters.”); id. at 415 (“[I]dentifying and
protecting abused children requires the coordinated efforts of those professionals required to report
cases of abuse. This interdisciplinary involvement results in confusing and ambiguous definitions of
child abuse. Consequently, professionals in the various disciplines often conclude differently about
whether a parent has abused a child.”).
3. The first legal scholar to focus on the vagueness of child-abuse definitions and the
extraordinary discretion this affords child-welfare authorities continues to be the most prominent voice
on the issue. See Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for
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definitional project has also been acknowledged. This difficulty stems both from
the relatively mundane problem of how textually to craft the definitions so that
they capture all and only what we want them to capture, and from the related
(but infinitely more complex) problem of how to resolve the ideological
tensions at play in this area.
Each of these explanations has merit. First, we do not want to be left with
definitions so fine that they disallow necessary protective interventions based in
different (nonnormative) or unprecedented and harmful parenting practices.
Although such instances are infrequent, the CPS community’s relatively recent
experience with non-European immigrants who engage in unusual (for the
United States) parenting practices, including family-formation practices, folkmedicine practices, and disciplinary practices,4 demonstrates that concerns
about flexibility are both real and legitimate.5 Second, it is incredibly hard to
craft precise statutory language; the annals of legislative history attest to the
truth of this proposition. It is especially tricky to do so in an ethnically,
religiously, and politically diverse setting like the United States, particularly
when the context relates to the intersection of intimate family matters and the
relationship of the state to the family. Legislators and elected judges operating
in a legal context where definitions already exist are likely to be better off if
they leave things alone; the alternative, at least politically, is unattractive:
entering the culture war that inevitably would result from efforts to codify
different rules that respectively privilege and de-privilege particular groups’
parenting norms.
Nonetheless, the premise of this article is that the distinction between
permissible and impermissible corporal punishment is too important to leave to
the only loosely guided discretion afforded by modern child-abuse definitions.
In particular, three negative effects of the status quo beg for at least a periodic
reevaluation of the prospects for more-precise tools to make this distinction.6

Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1001 (1975) (“Because the statutes do not reflect a
considered analysis of what types of harm justify the risks of intervention, decision-making is left to the
ad hoc analysis of social workers and judges.”). See also Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Legal Ethics
of Pediatric Research, 57 DUKE L.J. 517, 559 (2007) [hereinafter Coleman, Legal Ethics of Pediatric
Research] (discussing the “‘know it when you see it’ test for child maltreatment”); Doriane Lambelet
Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the
Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 428–29 (2005) [hereinafter Coleman, Storming the
Castle] (discussing the vagueness of typical statutory definitions of child abuse, including this flexibility
rationale, and citing cases that have used this rationale to reject constitutional “void for vagueness”
challenges to the definitions); Davidson, supra note 2, at 409–11 (discussing the failure of vagueness
challenges to child-abuse laws and the flexibility rationale that has supported the decisions).
4. See Alison Dundes Renteln, Corporal Punishment and the Cultural Defense, 73 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 258-61 (Spring 2010) (describing such unconventional disciplinary practices).
5. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: Multicultural Sensitivity and
Americanization, 47 DUKE L.J. 717, 717–18 (1998) (generally describing this immigration
phenomenon).
6. Several legal scholars and student commentators have contributed to this evaluation over the
years since states first began enacting mandatory reporting laws. Professor Michael Wald began the
process. See generally Wald, supra note 3. See also Howard Davidson, The Legal Aspects of Corporal
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We have already noted two of these effects: the law’s failure to fulfill its
expressive function (or the law’s signaling problems) and inconsistent case
outcomes. The third is the risk of error in both directions—false-positive and
false-negative findings of maltreatment—and the consequences of resulting
errors for children and families.7 This risk is an inevitable result of the
inconsistencies that plague the system. Importantly, errors (both ways) also
occur because—other than those respecting egregious physical harm—the
definitions do not codify a considered or generally accepted sense of the nature
of the harm the state intends to prohibit. Again, this has been left mostly
unresolved, either purposefully or by default. This means that the definitions
fail to provide decisionmakers with information about the right kinds of cases to
pursue. The ultimate objective of this article is to propose policy reforms that
will ameliorate the risk of errors as well as the systemic inconsistencies and
signaling problems already described.
We proceed toward this end on the assumption that reforms will be viable in
the long run only if they are the product of a careful accommodation of the
delicate political considerations at stake in matters of state–family relations and
of the medical and social-science evidence that explains when and how children
suffer harm. Specifically, we suggest policy reforms that (1) preserve the
traditional structure and substance of reasonable corporal-punishment
exceptions to child-abuse law, both of which are themselves premised on a
generous reading of parental-autonomy norms,8 and (2) require decisionmakers

Punishment in the Home: When Does Physical Discipline Cross the Line to Become Child Abuse?, 17
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 18 (1997); Davidson, supra note 2; Dyanne C. Greer, Child Abuse and
Discipline: A Parental and Prosecutorial Dilemma, 17 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 30 (1997); Kandice K.
Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense—Reasonable and
Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 413 (1998). Social scientists have separately
explored the issue of how to define abuse. See generally JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI & ROSINA M.
BECERRA, DEFINING CHILD ABUSE (1979); BARBARA LOWENTHAL, ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE
EDUCATOR’S GUIDE TO THE IDENTIFICATION AND PREVENTION OF CHILD MALTREATMENT (2001);
MARK A. WINTON & BARBARA A. MARA, CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY
APPROACHES (2001). And a few scholars have taken a multidisciplinary approach to the problem. See,
e.g., Robert E. Larzelere et al., Nonabusive Spanking: Parental Liberty or Child Abuse?, 17 CHILD.
LEGAL RTS. J. 7 (1997) (proposing a paradigm for determining how and where to draw the line
between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse framed according to legal constraints and informed
in relevant ways by science); Kimberlie Young, An Examination of Parental Discipline as a Defense of
Justification: It’s Time for a Kindlier, Gentler Approach, 46 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (1999).
7. See Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3, at 417–19 (discussing the problem of falsepositive and false-negative findings of maltreatment in general); Davidson, supra note 2, at 418–19
(discussing this problem as applied to corporal-punishment cases in particular, noting that
many of the current child abuse statutes provide juries with unstructured and unguided
discretion to distinguish between reasonable parental discipline and child abuse. Because this
is often an equivocal judgment, some parents who do in fact abuse their children . . . escape
the net in which legislation has attempted to catch them. . . . Conversely, the parents who are
caught in the net when the child is really not in danger of future abuse are also victims of
vague legislation.).
8. Norms are customary or widely held beliefs that may either influence or be influenced by law.
Parental autonomy norms, in particular, are widely held beliefs about the primacy of parents and
parental decisionmaking as against the state and decisions it might make in regards to the child. See
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to take systematic and consistent account of all relevant and valid evidence,
including medical and social-science evidence, that can shed light on the
reasonableness of parents’ actions. We adopt this approach for two reasons.
First, it is the reality on the ground that parental-autonomy norms interact
and even sometimes compete with medical and social-science perspectives as
the line is drawn in individual cases between reasonable corporal punishment
and maltreatment. Although this article treats only the institutional actors,
almost everyone involved in these cases uses one or the other or a hybrid
approach to doing the line-drawing work required under the rules.9 This
includes parents who use corporal punishment as a disciplinary tool; their
neighbors who have to decide whether to report them for child abuse; CPS
workers who process reports, investigate cases, and decide whether to
substantiate them; and judges who adjudicate claims of excessive corporal
punishment.
Second, although legal reform is sometimes warranted in the face of the
status quo, we do not believe that such confrontation is necessary here. It makes
sense that parental-autonomy norms and scientific knowledge should govern
the process of arriving at better definitions of reasonable corporal punishment
and physical abuse, and of sorting individual incidents and injuries along the
continuum of nonaccidental physical injuries. This approach best reflects what
history and social science tells us is good for children: a child-rearing model that
recognizes and establishes parents as the children’s “first[,] best” caretakers10
and that intervenes in the family only when necessary to protect the child from
harm that would be greater than that inevitably caused by the state’s own
intervention.11 This approach also reflects appropriate respect for parents’
traditional role and the “rights and responsibilities” paradigm that has long
governed American law in this area. Correspondingly, it acknowledges both
that the state cannot replace parents as the children’s “first[,] best” caretakers,

infra III.A (describing parental-autonomy norms and how these have influenced the development of
both federal constitutional and state laws governing decisionmaking about and on behalf of the child).
Individual parenting practices may or may not be normative in the empirical sense, see supra note 1.
Furthermore, nonnormative practices may or may not trigger state interference with parental
autonomy. Formally, the trigger for state action is a sense that serious harm is being caused or risked by
parental behavior. Although normativeness often properly influences that sense, it is not and should
not always be dispositive. See infra notes 80, 207, 209–223 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
normativeness as a factor in the decision whether to find reasonable corporal punishment or abuse).
9. Not everyone is implicated in this process, however. For example, some parents beat their
children for reasons unrelated to discipline, some neighbors report parents who use corporal
punishment not because they believe they are abusing their children but because they dislike them, and
some social workers and judges discriminate against families based simply on their race or cultural
background.
10. See SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 1–
2 (4th ed. 2009) (describing parents’ constitutional authority and their status in this context as “first
best” caretakers).
11. See generally Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3 (describing the harm that state
intervention in the family can do to children, even in circumstances where the states’ motive is to
protect them).
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and that the state has a proper role to play when parents make too much of
their rights and too little of their responsibilities, causing a net loss to their
children in the process.
Given these considerations and our objectives—to ameliorate systemic
inconsistencies, signaling problems, and false-positive and false-negative
errors—our principal suggestion is for policymakers to codify “functional
impairment” as the harm the state intends to prohibit. The term, adapted from
the medical sciences, refers to short- or long-term or permanent impairment of
emotional or physical functioning in tasks of daily living.12 (Currently, most
states’ maltreatment definitions prohibit practices and injuries that may lead to
functional impairment.)13 Correspondingly, we encourage adoption of functional
impairment as the standard for evaluating the reasonableness of the force used
and thus for drawing the line between reasonable corporal punishment and
abuse. We promote this standard to ensure that the state has the authority to
intervene in the family in the face of good evidence that a child has suffered or
risks suffering important disabilities, and to restrict state authority to intervene
merely to mediate suboptimal conditions. Relatedly, this standard serves to
assure, to the extent possible, that the public’s wisdom regarding the normative
use of corporal punishment is balanced with medical and scientific knowledge
of harm to the child.
Basing decisionmaking about the reasonableness of corporal punishment on
a combination of parental-autonomy norms and scientific evidence about harm,
as this functional-impairment test would do, is not new. For example, many
maltreatment statutes and regulatory schemes are expressly premised on both a
respect for family privacy and a focus on child well-being. And California’s
Attorney General has suggested that scientific knowledge about the
effectiveness of corporal punishment as a disciplinary tool should factor into the

12. E. Jane Costello et al., The Great Smoky Mountains Study of Youth Functional Impairment and
Serious Emotional Disturbance, 12 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1137, 1137 (1996). See generally, AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed.
1994) (DSM-IV); Bedirhan Ustun & Cille Kennedy, What Is “Functional Impairment”? Disentangling
Disability From Clinical Significance, 8 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 82, 82 (2009) (“Functional impairment
refers to limitations due to the illness, as people with a disease may not carry out certain functions in
their daily lives.”); id. at 83 (stating “the DSM-IV term ‘functional impairment’ is not specifically
defined. It is used to mean limitations in the social and occupational spheres of life”) (emphasis in
original); id. (clarifying that a “disorder must be associated with either distress or [functional
impairment]” before a diagnosis can be rendered). Consistent with this definition, “harm” throughout
this article is thus defined as serious immediate or delayed impairment in functioning, including
physical injury, emotional injury, and behavioral maladjustment. See also infra III.B and notes 193–195
(elaborating on this concept and applying it to the problem of sorting reasonable corporal punishment
from abuse).
13. See infra II.A (setting out and discussing examples of typical state provisions). See also supra
note 12 (describing how functional impairment operates in this way in the more-typical medical
context).

COLEMAN, DODGE, & CAMPBELL

Spring 2010]

10/25/2010 12:50:15 PM

WHERE AND HOW TO DRAW THE LINE

113

evaluation of whether it is legally reasonable to spank a toddler.14 However,
these initiatives are not systematic and often lack rigor; they do not necessarily
reflect a considered evaluation and reconciliation of the relevant norms and
scientific knowledge, or of whether basing a decision on either or both in
combination makes sense in a given situation. Nor have they ameliorated the
negative effects that are our target: the failure of the law to fulfill its expressive
function, inconsistent case analyses and outcomes, and false-positive and falsenegative errors. We hope that in its multidisciplinary approach and system
descriptions, and in its related suggestions for definitional and methodological
reform, this article will begin to do some of this work. In the process, we hope
that it will dissolve some of the long-standing conceptual and communications
impasses among the various affected disciplines.
The article proceeds as follows: Part II describes what is known about how
the relevant institutional actors—legislatures, CPS, and courts—currently find
and define the line between reasonable and unlawful corporal punishment.15
Part III separately describes the parental-autonomy norms and scientific
knowledge that currently compete for primacy in the discourse about corporal
punishment and, as far as we can tell, largely contribute to decisions about the
lawfulness of particular incidents “on the ground.” Part IV begins with an
argument for definitional and methodological changes that reflects both
parental-autonomy norms and scientific knowledge and follows with specific
suggestions for policy reform. These suggestions include proposals for
redefining reasonable and unlawful corporal punishment and for sorting cases
along the continuum of nonaccidental physical injuries.
II
HOW THE RELEVANT LEGAL ACTORS DEFINE AND DRAW THE LINE
BETWEEN REASONABLE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AND ABUSE
The three legal institutions responsible for where and how the states draw
the line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse are the state
legislatures, which announce and define allowances and prohibitions in the first
instance; CPS agencies and professionals, also known as departments of social
services or DSS, which administer the legislative mandates and thus most
directly engage families and children; and the courts, which are charged with
interpreting legislation in the last instance, and which thus act as a check on
decisions made by CPS. In an effort to develop a comprehensive sense of how
each of these institutions makes decisions in this area and, in particular, if and
14. 80 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. No. 97-416 (1997). California law permits reasonable corporal
punishment but defines this narrowly as “age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks.” CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 300 (2006).
15. Because it is beyond the scope of this article to consider how children and parents are treated
once maltreatment has been found, we do not discuss actors such as therapists and family counselors,
who are also important but who are involved only after this point.
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how they might differ in their approaches, we conducted three studies. The first
involved a cataloging and examination of all the states’ civil legislation defining
child abuse and reasonable corporal punishment. The second involved a series
of interviews with CPS professionals, including CPS directors, supervisors, and
frontline social workers in counties in several states across the country. Our
interviews were designed to establish the degree and nature of the discretion
CPS professionals have as they evaluate cases involving parental claims of
reasonable corporal punishment. The third study involved a cataloging and
examination of all of the states’ published judicial opinions in civil cases
concerning the definition of child abuse and the evaluation of reasonableness in
the corporal-punishment setting. The results of this data collection are
described below.
A. Legislatures
All United States jurisdictions have statutory definitions of child abuse
consistent with the medical model of child abuse, which focuses specifically on
the immediate and short-term physical effects of abuse on the child.16 Childabuse definitions typically appear in both the criminal and civil sections of a
state’s statutory code.17 Definitions in the states’ civil codes—which are the
focus of this article—typically appear in mandatory child-maltreatmentreporting statutes or in juvenile-court-jurisdiction statutes. The former provide
guidance to mandated reporters and the latter establish the basis for the state to
exercise jurisdiction over the child and family.18
1. Features of Typical Statutory Abuse Definitions
In general, states define physical abuse of a child to include harm or
threatened harm to a child’s health or welfare, nonaccidental physical injury, or
serious physical injury inflicted by an act or omission of a parent or another
adult responsible for the child’s care. Regardless of their terminology, the
definitions focus on harm or injury to the child. Most employ the terms physical
harm or physical injury.19 Additionally, many states classify as abuse acts or
omissions that create a risk or substantial risk of physical injury or harm.
Several states require not only a finding of physical injury but also a

16. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE
NEGLECT 2 (2007), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/
define.pdf. Medical models focus on the child, specifically on the physical consequences of the parental
conduct for the child, rather than on the motivation of the parent. See CLIFFORD K. DORNE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO CHILD MALTREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, PUBLIC POLICY AND
RESEARCH 89–110 (Willow Tree Press 3d ed. 2002) (1962) (describing the emergence of the medical
model of child abuse in the United States).
17. See Child Welfare Information Gateway, Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect (2010),
http://www.childwelfare.gov/can/defining/state.cfm. This website provides definitions applicable in the
civil law context.
18. Id.
19. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.68(2)(a) (West 2006) (“[a]ny nonaccidental physical injury”).
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determination that the injury harms the child or impairs the health of the child.20
On the other hand, in Arkansas, certain intentional or knowing acts constitute
abuse whether or not the child sustains physical injury. For example, a parent
who “[s]trik[es] a child six . . . years of age or younger on the face or head” or
“[i]nterfer[es] with a child’s breathing,” among other acts, has abused his or her
child under the statute regardless of injury to the child.21
A few states define abuse to include only nonaccidental physical injuries
that are “serious.” For example, Pennsylvania defines child abuse as “[a]ny
recent act or failure to act . . . which causes non-accidental serious physical
injury to a child under 18 years of age” or “which creates an imminent risk of
serious physical injury to a child under 18 years of age.”22 The statute further
defines “serious physical injury” to mean an injury that “causes a child severe
pain; or significantly impairs a child’s physical functioning, either temporarily or
permanently.”23 North Carolina also employs the language “serious physical
injury.”24
Although state statutory definitions of physical abuse are similar in that they
emphasize harm to the child or nonaccidental physical injury, minor variations
among definitions exist. The most notable variation among definitions is their
level of specificity. Just over half of state definitions contain only broad
language and fail to provide specific examples of injuries or acts constituting
physical abuse or to elaborate otherwise on the meaning of physical harm or
injury. For example, Iowa’s definition provides that “[c]hild abuse or abuse
means any non-accidental physical injury, or injury which is at variance with the
history given of it, suffered by a child as the result of the acts or omissions of a
person responsible for the care of the child.”25 In contrast, other states
enumerate within their definitions specific injuries or acts that constitute
physical abuse or otherwise expand on the definition of physical harm or
physical injury. For example, Arkansas’ statutory definition provides a list of
“intentional or knowing acts, with physical injury and without justifiable

20. E.g., 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007) (defining an abused child as
“a child whose parent or [other responsible party] inflicts . . . physical injury, by other than accidental
means, which causes death, disfigurement, impairment of physical or emotional health, or loss or
impairment of any bodily function”); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006)
(defining abuse as “the physical . . . injury of a child . . . under circumstances that indicate that the
child’s health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk of being harmed”).
21. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-18-103(2)(A)(vii)(a), 12-18-103(2)(A)(vii)(c) (2009).
22. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6303(b)(1)(i), 6303(b)(1)(iii) (West 2001) (emphasis added).
23. § 6303(a)(1)–(2).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-101(1)(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
25. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.68 (West 2006). Likewise, North Carolina defines an “abused
juvenile” as “[a]ny juvenile less than 18 years of age whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker
inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the juvenile a serious physical injury by other than accidental
means; creates or allows to be created a substantial risk of serious physical injury to the juvenile by
other than accidental means, [or] uses or allows to be used upon the juvenile cruel or grossly
inappropriate procedures or cruel or grossly inappropriate devices to modify behavior.” N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 7B-101 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
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cause”26 that constitute abuse, as well as a list of “intentional or knowing acts,
with or without physical injury”27 that constitute abuse. Among the acts that
constitute abuse with a showing of physical injury are “[t]hrowing, kicking,
burning, biting, or cutting a child; [s]triking a child with a closed fist; [s]haking a
child; or [s]triking a child on the face or head.”28 Similarly, Florida’s statute
provides that abuse is “any willful act or threatened act that results in any
physical . . . injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child’s physical,
mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired.”29 It then enumerates
injuries that can harm a child’s health or welfare. The enumerated injuries
range from willfully inflicted “sprains, dislocations, or cartilage damage” to
“intracranial hemorrhage or injury to other internal organs.”30
Definitions with a greater degree of specificity provide additional guidance
to CPS workers and judges who are charged with determining whether a given
act or injury constitutes physical abuse. In some cases, the act or injury may fall
precisely within one of the enumerated classes. In others, decisionmakers may
be able to compare the suspicious act or injury to one of the enumerated classes
to determine if it is sufficiently similar.31 Statutes containing enumerated lists
typically specify that the lists are illustrative and not exclusive, thereby
reserving for decisionmakers a certain measure of discretion.32
Finally, a few states use both the abuse and neglect classifications for
unlawful physical injuries to a child, sorting cases between these classifications
not according to the act or omission causing the injury, but rather according to
the relative degree of severity of the injury itself. For example, New York
explicitly includes “excessive corporal punishment” within its statutory-neglect
definition.33 Thus, it defines an abused child as one who suffers “physical injury
by other than accidental means which causes or creates a substantial risk of
death, or serious or protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment of
physical or emotional health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of

26. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-18-103(2)(A)(vi) (2009).
27. Id. at §§ 12-18-103(2)(A)(VII) (2009). See supra note 21 and accompanying text (setting this
clause in context and noting its outright prohibition of strikes to the face or interference with the
breathing of a child).
28. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-18-103(2)(A)(vii)(a)–(d) (2009).
29. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
30. Id. at §§ 39.01(31)(a), 30.01(31)(d). Illinois defines physical abuse as the infliction of
nonaccidental physical injury that causes “death, disfigurement, impairment of physical or emotional
health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function.” 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3(a) (West 2001 &
Supp. 2007).
31. E.g., Stella M. v. Daniel T.-W., 1997 WL 634580, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1997) (failing to
find abuse because “red marks on a child’s buttocks are [not] in the same category as burns and severe
or frequent bruising” when “physical injury” was defined to include lacerations, fractured bones, burns,
internal injuries, severe or frequent bruising, or great bodily harm).
32. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(31)(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (explaining that the list of
injuries to follow is not all-inclusive).
33. § 371(4-a)(i)(B).
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bodily organ.”34 And it classifies as neglected a child whose physical condition
has been impaired or harmed, but not injured seriously enough to create a
substantial risk of death or protracted disfigurement or impairment.35 Other
states adopting this approach have done so either informally or by
administrative regulation. For example, North Carolina’s CPS agencies employ
a decision tree that requires classifying as neglect by inappropriate discipline
any instance of corporal punishment that transgresses the agencies’
reasonableness criteria but that does not meet its abuse standards.36
2. Statutory Allowances for Reasonable Corporal Punishment
Statutory definitions of physical abuse appearing in state family- or juvenilecourt codes commonly except reasonable measures of physical discipline
administered by parents.37 This exception reflects the longstanding common-law
privilege of discipline, which provides that “[a] parent is privileged to apply
such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his child
as he reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or
education.”38
34. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 371(4-b)(i) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
35. § 371(4-a)(i).
36. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-101(15) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006) (defining neglect to include
inappropriate discipline); see also § 7B-101(11a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006) (defining the familyassessment response). In January 2006, all North Carolina counties adopted a version of the Multiple
Response System, which separately provides that CPS must track less-severe instances of inappropriate
discipline or unreasonable corporal punishment onto a nonadversarial “family assessment” track. This
move reinforces North Carolina’s commitment to distinguishing instances of corporal punishment that
are properly classified as abuse (and tracked accordingly, onto the adversarial-investigative track) from
those that are to be classified as neglect. Several other states have a version of the MRS, including
Missouri, Michigan, and Washington, see http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabId=17800, but their
neglect definitions do not explicitly include inappropriate discipline. In Michigan, for example, CPS
workers can classify cases into five categories, depending on the sufficiency of the evidence and risk
level. Michigan Dep’t of Human Serv, Children’s Protective Services Investigation Process, http://
www.michigan.gov/dhs/0,1607,7-124-5452_7119_7194-159484--,00.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2009). If
evidence indicating low-risk abuse or neglect is sufficient, CPS officials can require community-based
services without listing the perpetrator in an abuse or neglect registry. Even if the evidence is
insufficient, CPS officials can still offer services on a voluntary basis.
37. Even in states that lack physical-discipline exceptions within their family or juvenile-court
codes, courts have recognized a parent’s physical-discipline privilege based on a statutory privilege
found in the criminal code or a common-law privilege. For example, the Connecticut Court of Appeals
recognized that a criminal statute granting parents a privilege to use reasonable physical force to
correct their child “demonstrate[d] the public recognition of the parental right to punish children for
their own welfare” and thus expressed the “state’s policy of allowing reasonable corporal punishment.”
Lovan C. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 860 A.2d 1283, 1288 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). Likewise,
despite Iowa’s lack of a statutory exception for reasonable physical discipline, the state’s Supreme
Court recognized that “[t]he law clearly gives parents who are so inclined the right to inflict reasonable
corporal punishment in connection with the rearing of their children.” In re W.G., 349 N.W.2d 487, 487
(Iowa 1984). In sum, parents in all states may physically discipline their children provided that such
discipline does not cross the line to become physical abuse.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147 (1965); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (2001).
State common law is law as it has evolved and continues to evolve in the state courts. For examples of
judicial decisions reflecting the traditional common-law corporal-punishment privilege, see State v.
Lefevre, 117 P.3d 980, 984 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (“[A] parent has a privilege to use moderate or
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Twenty-one states, along with the District of Columbia, except reasonable
physical discipline from their statutory definitions of physical abuse. These
provisions typically use the term “reasonable” to describe legally acceptable
corporal punishment, although some employ the term “excessive” to describe
corporal punishment that has crossed the line of acceptability.39 For example,
the District of Columbia’s statute provides that abuse “does not include
discipline administered by a parent, guardian, or custodian to his or her child;
provided, that the discipline is reasonable in manner and moderate in degree
and otherwise does not constitute cruelty.”40 The statute then provides an
illustrative list of specific acts that are unacceptable forms of discipline for
purposes of the exception. Among these acts are “burning, biting, or cutting a
child” and “nonaccidental injury to a child under the age of 18 months.”41
Similarly, in Florida, physical discipline can be considered excessive when it
results in “significant bruises or welts,” among other enumerated injuries.42
Finally, in addition to requiring that discipline be reasonable in nature and
degree, several states’ statutes formally require decisionmakers to evaluate as a
threshold matter whether the injury or incident was disciplinary in nature; the
consequences flowing from that evaluation differ, depending on the
jurisdiction.43 The most common of these provisions expressly codifies the twopronged, common-law standard requiring parents seeking refuge under the
privilege or exception to prove, first, that discipline was reasonably necessary or
appropriate under the circumstances and, second, that the nature and degree of
force used itself was reasonable. For example, Hawaii’s statute provides that
[t]he use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable [when] . . . (a)
[t]he force is employed with due regard for the age and size of the minor and is
reasonably related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the
minor, including the prevention or punishment of the minor’s misconduct; and (b)
[t]he force used is not designed to cause or known to create a risk of causing

reasonable physical force, without criminal liability, when engaged in the discipline of his or her child . .
. [but] [t]he physical force cannot be cruel or excessive if it is to be justified.”); Anderson v. State, 487
A.2d 294, 297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (“As a defense . . . to what would otherwise be an assault and
battery, an individual in loco parentis may sometimes, but not always, establish that the force used upon
the child was privileged as necessary and proper to the exercise of domestic authority.”).
39. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia provide that reasonable physical discipline is not
abuse. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 16, at 5. The fourteen states are Arkansas, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas,
and Washington. Id. In addition to these explicit exceptions for reasonable physical discipline, seven
other states implicitly exclude reasonable physical discipline by providing that excessive corporal
punishment is abuse: Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and
Wyoming.
40. D.C. CODE § 16-2301(23)(B)(1) (2001 & Supp. 2007).
41. §§ 16-2301(23)(B)(1)(I), 16-2301(23)(B)(1)(IV).
42. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(4)(k) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
43. The requirement of a disciplinary motive is inherent in the allowance, see infra notes 44–46 and
129–145 and accompanying text; the text of most exceptions and an apparent deference to parents’
sense of the circumstances leads decisionmakers generally to focus only on the reasonableness of the
nature and degree of force used.

COLEMAN, DODGE, & CAMPBELL

Spring 2010]

10/25/2010 12:50:15 PM

WHERE AND HOW TO DRAW THE LINE

119

substantial bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress, or
44
neurological damage.

At least one state, Ohio, appears to provide parents with statutory authority
to cause a child more harm in disciplinary contexts than in nondisciplinary
contexts; its corporal-punishment exception provides that physical discipline
that is “excessive under the circumstances and creates a substantial risk of
serious physical harm to the child”45 constitutes abuse, whereas acts other than
physical discipline constitute abuse whenever they “harm the child’s health or
welfare.”46
B. Child Protective Services
Although state legislatures are responsible for defining maltreatment in the
first instance, the law on the ground is mostly set by the CPS professionals
charged with investigating and supervising the investigation of maltreatment
reports.47 Specifically, CPS professionals are responsible for determining
whether particular factual situations described in the reports qualify as abuse or
neglect, or are appropriately classified as reasonable corporal punishment.48 The
vagueness inherent in most statutory definitions—including specifically in
disciplinary exemptions that, without more, permit “reasonable” and disallow
“excessive” corporal punishment—assures that, absent additional constraints,
individual CPS professionals and departments have quite a lot of discretion as
to the methodology they use to do this triage and as to where they ultimately
draw the line between reasonable and unlawful corporal punishment. Even
when CPS decisionmaking is administratively constrained, however, personal
and community ideology continues to play a considerable role in this process.
1.The Factors that Influence CPS Decisionmaking
Consistent with prevailing statutory language, when evaluating whether an
act of corporal punishment was reasonable or abusive, CPS most typically

44. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 703-309 (1) (West 2009). Other states have similar statutes. E.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §468(1) (2009) (Delaware); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.061(1) (West 2009) (Missouri);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(2)(ii) (2006) (South Carolina).
45. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(B)(3) (West 2006). Section 2919 is part of Ohio’s penal code.
It is included here because the definition of physical abuse for purposes of juvenile-court jurisdiction
defines an abused child as one endangered as defined in section 2919.22. See § 2151.031(B).
46. § 2151.031(D). Thus, physical discipline must seriously harm the child—not just harm the
child—before it rises to the level of abuse. “Serious physical harm” is defined in the statute to include
physical harm involving the following: a substantial risk of death, some permanent or temporary
substantial incapacity, permanent or temporary substantial disfigurement, or acute pain. §
2901.01(5)(a)–(e).
47. This law is effectively dispositive because CPS decisions in individual cases mostly go
uncontested. See GIOVANNONI & BECERRA, supra note 6, at 59 (explaining that “appellate cases in
neglect matters have been unusually rare” and that this can be attributed to “the lack of sophistication
and financial resources of the majority of parents affected”).
48. DORNE, supra note 16, at 153–54.
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considers the nature and degree of the immediate physical harm to the child.49
The extent to which that injury may have long-term or even permanent physical
consequences will generally affect the CPS determination, particularly in those
jurisdictions that require a serious or severe injury either statutorily or by
custom. Depending on the jurisdiction and the individual decisionmaker,
however, such consequences may not be required; indeed, a common CPS
practice holds that a bruise lasting for more than twenty-four hours is sufficient
to meet the maltreatment standard.50 Relatedly, to the extent that an immediate
but not serious or severe physical injury implicates a risk of more-serious harm
in the future, CPS may choose to denominate that original injury abuse. In fact,
for some CPS agents and departments, risk is one of the most important
criteria.51

49. All interviewees remain anonymous, at their request. Telephone interview by Erin Vernon,
Duke University School of Law, with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June 26, 2009)
(on file with Law and Contemporary Problems, hereinafter, L & CP); telephone interview by Erin
Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L
& CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June
25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director,
Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a
county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009)
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas
County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane
Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on
file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS
supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A.
Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb.
16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
50. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect, When Inflicted
Skin Injuries Constitute Child Abuse, 110 PEDIATRICS 644, 644 (2002), available at http://
aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics;110/3/644.pdf (“One practical criterion often used is
that any inflicted injury that lasts more than twenty-four hours constitutes significant injury (i.e.,
physical abuse).”) (citing IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, EMPLOYEES’ MANUAL (1997),
available at http://www.extension.iastate.edu/Publications/PM1810.pdf (listing “[r]eddening of surface
tissue lasting more than 24 hours” as a “[p]hysical sign of possible child abuse”)). The relevance of a
bruise lasting for more than twenty-four hours varies across jurisdictions and agencies and there may
even be an equivocal standard within a single agency. For instance, in one county in North Carolina,
bruises lasting for longer than twenty-four hours were described as both sufficient and insufficient on
their own to justify a finding of maltreatment. See interview by Kenneth Dodge and Doriane Coleman
with a county CPS supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (February 13, 2009) (on file with L & CP). In
Nebraska, the existence of a bruise for more than twenty-four hours is enough to ensure an
investigation but is not enough on its own to result in an abuse or neglect finding. See telephone
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) (on file
with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb.
(June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP). Moreover, in Oregon, a bruise lasting more than twenty-four
hours prioritizes the investigation, but in some cases a bruise that lasts less than twenty-four hours may
be enough to substantiate abuse. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline
investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin
Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
51. See interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS
director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP) (listing risk as the second most
important factor); see telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County,
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Other common criteria include chronicity, or the frequency with which a
particular child is subject to corporal punishment,52 the location of the injury on
the child’s body,53 the child’s age54 and special-needs status,55 whether an object
was used,56 and the immediate or long-term emotional and developmental

Neb. (June 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP) (most important factor in safety analysis); telephone
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file
with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas
County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS
supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June 26, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
52. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline
investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin
Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP);
telephone interview by Erin Vernon, with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June
17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline
investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin
Vernon with county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP);
interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor,
Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and
Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file
with L & CP).
53. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline
investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin
Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); see
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with County CPS Director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009)
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with county CPS supervisor, Adams
County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a
county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file
with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS
supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A.
Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb.
16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
54. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon, with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a
county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by
Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP);
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 17, 2009)
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator,
Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon
with county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by
Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, Durham County,
N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet
Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
55. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon, with a county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas
County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon, with a
county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
56. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a
county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by
Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP);
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June
17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor,
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ramifications of the physical harm.57 Like risk, these criteria can contribute to a
finding of abuse even in cases in which the immediate physical injury, standing
alone, is relatively moderate and thus would otherwise be classified as
reasonable.58 For example, evidence of chronicity, the use of an object such as a
belt or a switch, the child’s fear of the parent or anxiety about the safety of the
home, or an injury in a location other than the buttocks (harm to the head or
neck is particularly provocative in this regard) may cause CPS to classify as
abuse a bruise lasting for more than twenty-four hours, even if that same agency
would normally decline to intervene based on the injury alone.59
Finally, in the evaluation of individual incidents and injuries, CPS may
consider parents’ rights and family privacy, including parents’ motivation for
using corporal punishment and parents’ ethnic or cultural background. Parents’
rights and family privacy may be considered as essential factors to be balanced
against harm to the child or as relatively insignificant in light of the agency’s
mandate to focus on child welfare.60 Parents’ motivation is more or less relevant

Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane
Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on
file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS
supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A.
Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb.
16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
57. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb.
(June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline
investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin
Vernon with county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L &
CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June
25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with
a county CPS frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP);
telephone interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS
supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A.
Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb.
16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
58. See, e.g., telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a
county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
59. See, e.g., interview by Kenneth Dodge and Doriane Coleman with a county CPS supervisor,
Durham County, N.C. (February 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
60. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline
investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin
Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP);
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009)
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams
County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a
county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file
with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS
frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by
Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, Durham County,
N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet
Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
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to agencies or social workers depending on the extent to which they believe the
inquiry should focus entirely on medical harm to the child; when motivation
matters in the analysis, parents may be permitted to cause more harm than they
would when it is not a consideration.61 Relatedly, CPS professionals may
consider the family’s ethnic or cultural background, as in assessing whether a
particular form of corporal punishment is normative in the family’s
community.62 As with parental motivation, however, those who focus primarily
on medical harm to the child will tend to discount or ignore diversity of
parenting practices.63
2. Exercising and Constraining Discretion
The factors that a particular CPS social worker or agency considers in
drawing the line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse, and the
weight the factors are given, depend on two circumstances: the extent to which
the agency or social worker is administratively (by regulation, policy, or
protocol) constrained and the decisionmaker’s own community norms,
disciplinary training, and personal ideology. The more elaborate the
administrative constraints, the less likely it is that divergent norms, training, and
ideology will influence the decision. However, because it is impossible to
eliminate entirely the need for CPS to exercise discretion—at the margins, the
line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse is “uncertain and
wavering” at best64—norms, training, and ideology play a role even within

61. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a
county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
62. See interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS
frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
63. See, e.g., interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS
supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
64. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane
Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L
& CP). The phrase “uncertain and wavering line” comes from Justice William S. Andrews’ famous
dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928), in which he describes the
trouble judges have deciding whether a defendant was a proximate cause of an accident. He explains
that this decision sometimes involves imprecise line-drawing because
[t]here are no fixed rules to govern our judgment. There are simply matters of which we can
take account . . . . Many things contribute to the spread of the conflagration—the force of
the wind, the direction and width of the streets, the character of intervening structures,
other factors. We draw an uncertain and wavering line, but draw it we must as best we can.
Id. The decision where to draw the line between reasonable corporal punishment and maltreatment has
been described similarly. See, e.g., interview by Kenneth Dodge and Doriane Coleman with a CPS
director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP) (expressing disagreement with the
idea that a continuum spans reasonable corporal punishment and abuse because this suggests,
erroneously, that there is a single place where professionals draw the line; explaining that a complicated
set of factors must be considered instead and that even using these factors, “rough cuts” still need to be
made in certain cases; and noting that these involve subjectivity and common sense on the part of the
professionals involved).
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tightly constrained programs. This gap between statutory requirements and “on
the street” practice is well known in political science and public-policy analysis
more generally.65
CPS agencies and social workers across the country vary in the extent to
which they are administratively constrained as they evaluate individual cases of
alleged abuse. Until recently, CPS decisionmaking was relatively unconstrained,
resulting in a landscape where social workers’ personal orientations influenced
results.66 In jurisdictions following this approach, a social worker or agency
holding particularly strong views (one way or the other) on the moral or
religious foundations for corporal punishment or on the relevance of any
emotional or developmental impacts, might render decisions about the
reasonableness of individual instances of corporal punishment (at least in part)
according to those views. The current trend is to the contrary: jurisdictions at
either the state or the county level tend to adopt elaborate regulatory schemes
designed to standardize, to the extent possible, the decisionmaking process and
the scenarios that will and will not constitute unlawful corporal punishment.67
Some administrative protocols for substantiating maltreatment include only
immediate physical factors such as the age and size of the child and the severity,
duration, and location of the mark.68 Protocols may also take into consideration
other observable or quantifiable factors like the object used, the number of hits
or strikes, and the chronicity, but may exclude most or all emotional and
developmental factors.69 Increasingly common among these new regulatory

65. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980).
66. See Wald, supra note 3, at 1001 (“Because the statutes do not reflect a considered analysis of
what types of harm justify the risks of intervention, decisionmaking is left to the ad hoc analysis of
social workers and judges.”); supra notes 2–3 (describing this phenomenon). Cf. GIOVANNONI &
BECERRA, supra note 6, at 11 (“There is strong evidence that these professionals feel this burden [of
interpretation] keenly and are extremely dissatisfied with the ambiguous criteria under which they must
operate.”). Research in the social sciences also supports the influence of personal and professional
orientations on social workers’ maltreatment classifications. See Vicki Ashton, The Effect of Personal
Characteristics on Reporting Child Maltreatment, 28 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 985, 986 (2004).
67. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane
Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L &
CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor,
Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
68. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb.
(June 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS
supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin
Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L
& CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County,
Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); see telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS
supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
69. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb.
(June 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS
supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP) (both Nebraska interviewees
said they do not use the child’s emotional development in their maltreatment assessment); telephone
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with
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schemes are those that focus most broadly on the physical, emotional, and
developmental implications of the child’s injury70 and that involve a list of
factors (differently weighted and sometimes integrated) that social workers
must address in their investigations and evaluations.71 Unlike the approach that
takes into consideration only immediate physical factors, this approach involves
a more-complex analysis of whether a particular incident involves acceptable or
unlawful corporal punishment; that is, in addition to considering the medical
nature of the immediate physical injury, it places significant value on risk and
on the nonphysical implications of physical injuries.72
For example, North Carolina, which has a state-supervised, countyadministered CPS system, has established at the state level a decision tree that
requires county CPS agencies and their social workers to evaluate not only the
degree (severity) and nature of the physical injury at issue, but also factors such
as the injury’s location on the body, whether an object was used, whether the
injury is evidenced by a bruise lasting for more than twenty-four hours, the
number of times the child was hit, the child’s developmental age, the family’s
history with corporal punishment (chronicity) and with CPS, the child’s sense of
safety in the home and with the offending parent, the injury’s emotional and
developmental implications (including school-related implications), and the risk
of future harm.73 Kansas’ Department of Child Protective Services’ investigation
protocol similarly contains a fairly long list of factors including medical facts
such as the severity and location of the injury as well as developmental
implications, including a child’s ability to succeed in school and his or her
emotional response, which must be considered during each investigation.74
Notwithstanding these sometimes elaborate constraints, social workers
continue to be influenced by considerations external to the protocols. These
considerations may be in direct contravention of the protocols, or they may

L & CP) (according to interviewee, Georgia does not consider a child’s ability to be successful at school
as a factor in maltreatment investigations); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS
frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by
Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP)
(both Oregon interviewees said they “sort of” considered a child’s emotional development, but
emphasized they really consider that factor in neglect cases as opposed to physical maltreatment cases).
70. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a
county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) (on file
with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb.
(June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
71. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
72. See id.; interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS
supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
73. See interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS
director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
74. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
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simply supplement formal assessment criteria as social workers exercise their
remaining discretion. External considerations include factors that may be part
of other protocols inapplicable to the threshold maltreatment assessment,
community norms, and personal histories, training, and ideology. For example,
when prompted with a list of factors and asked if each was considered during
the investigation, CPS officials frequently responded in the affirmative, despite
a factor’s absence from the official protocol.75 A Kansas frontline investigator
explicitly stated that she considered temporary parental stress, even though it is
not a factor in the policy manual. She went on to explain that she tries to take in
every possible consideration.76 Additionally, interviews conducted with eleven
CPS officials in five states suggest that regardless of each state’s particular
protocols and regulations, risk of future harm is a significant factor in evaluating
whether a particular instance of corporal punishment is reasonable.77 Some CPS
officials acknowledge that they are taking factors pertinent to the postsubstantiation safety assessment into account as they evaluate the threshold
question of maltreatment, in part because conducting assessments concurrently
is more efficient. 78 These additional factors include the parent’s level of control
in the situation, any temporary stressors present in the home, how the current
situation affects future situations, and the risk of future incidents.79
Community culture and norms also influence even those social workers
whose decisions are constrained by formal factors, protocols, or decision trees.
For example, community attitudes toward corporal punishment often affect the
criminal investigation, and if criminal charges are not filed, social workers must

75. See id.
76. See id.; telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County,
Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS
frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
77. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline
investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin
Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP);
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009)
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams
County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon, with a
county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file
with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS
director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). Risk is considered relevant to the
determination of maltreatment not only because abuse is expressly defined to include both harm and a
risk of harm, but also because, as a practical matter, a finding of significant risk permits CPS to
intervene in the family to protect the child from future harm.
78. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb.
(June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline
investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
79. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb.
(June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director,
Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
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consider how such attitudes may weaken their civil maltreatment case.80 One
social worker in Oregon, who has worked in both a rural county and an urban
county, is particularly sensitive to community ideology and its subsequent effect
on judicial decisions.81 She found that judges in urban communities are much
less lenient toward parents’ use of corporal punishment compared with judges
in rural communities. She attributed this to the election of judges based on the
electorate’s ideological views and to judges’ subsequent preoccupation with
reelection. Although formally she considers the same factors whether
investigating in a rural or urban community, she does consider how specific
factors and evidence will be viewed by a particular court or judge.82 Removing a
child may not be helpful if a judge will ultimately return the child to the parent.
Consequently, social workers consider what a particular judge will do, and that
consideration may change how they proceed with the family.83
Finally, personal histories, training, and ideology may continue to influence
social workers’ exercise of discretion, regardless of the nature of the
administrative constraints under which they are placed. For example, all of the
CPS officials interviewed emphasized the importance their jurisdiction’s
substantiation protocols place on the child’s sense of safety in the home, but
several cautioned that this criterion requires a thorough evaluation of why the
child is afraid.84 In exercising the discretion required for this evaluation, one
frontline investigator in Kansas explained her feeling that a child’s fear of a
parent is an important factor that should be taken seriously.85 In contrast, some
investigators think the fear of being punished is insufficient.86 One North

80. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas
County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline
investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin
Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP);
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009)
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams
County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a
county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file
with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS
frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by
Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, Durham County,
N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet
Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
85. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
86. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline
investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin
Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
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Carolina CPS supervisor in a rural county hesitated to consider fear a good
indicator of abuse.87 She explained by describing her experience with corporal
punishment growing up: “When I was a child and my daddy said I was going to
get beat when I got home, I was certainly scared and fearful of going home, but
this is not abuse.”88 A particularly provocative example of the relevance of
personal and professional perspectives involves social workers’ views of the
relevance of family privacy and parents’ rights to the maltreatment
determination. Specifically, although all interviewees acknowledged CPS’s
responsibility to respect family privacy, including parents’ right to use corporal
punishment to discipline their children, they also explained their view that their
job is to protect children from harm, not to protect parents’ privacy rights. They
further explained that this obligation encompasses both children’s physical
welfare and their emotional and developmental well-being, and that well-being
should be understood, on the basis of social science evidence, to be relevant to
proving unlawful discipline.89 Implicit in their perspective is the view that the
child’s and parents’ interests are not obviously coterminous and that family
privacy and parental rights are not necessarily good for children.
87. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
88. Id. The relevance of parental motivation appears similarly to be influenced by social workers’
personal perspectives. For example, in one North Carolina county, the CPS supervisor believed
parental motivation did not matter when investigating an incident, whereas the frontline worker in the
same county thought it was significant. See interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet
Coleman with a county CPS frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L
& CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor,
Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). In contrast, in a county in Oregon, the
director thought parental motivation was a “very important” factor while the frontline investigator
placed far less importance upon that particular factor. See interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane
Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on
file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS
supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). Social workers in rural
counties are often personally familiar with the families in the community and thus may have
preconceived notions about a particular family which can affect how the investigation proceeds. See
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009)
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County,
Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS
frontline investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
89. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline
investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin
Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP);
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009)
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams
County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a
county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file
with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS
frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by
Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, Durham County,
N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet
Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
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C. Courts
Courts act as a check on CPS decisions to intervene in the family.
Depending on the jurisdiction, trial courts may be specially denominated
family, juvenile, or dependency courts. They approve (or not) CPS decisions to
declare children in need of protection, either temporarily, during the pendency
of an investigation, or for a longer term, following substantiation of
maltreatment. Trial-court involvement in the CPS process is routine, thus
establishing trial-court judges as critical players of the law as it is practiced on
the ground. Appellate courts have authority to review trial-court decisions.
However, very few trial-court decisions are appealed by either party. Not many
parents have the will or the resources to appeal adverse decisions.90 And CPS
agencies may face political and procedural hurdles that make appeals difficult
for them too.91 As a result, although appellate courts are formally superior
institutions and responsible for making common law, they are less relevant on a
day-to-day basis than trial courts.
Although trial courts may be more likely than appellate courts to render
decisions favorable to CPS because of their ongoing working relationship with
its professionals, both trial and appellate courts retain wide discretion in
determining whether an act of physical discipline constitutes unlawful physical
abuse. This discretion is attributable both to the broad and imprecise language
found in most statutory definitions of physical abuse and to the fact that judges
are free either to be guided by92 or to disregard unreasonable agency
interpretations of that language.93 Ultimately, because of this broad discretion,
but also probably because of their different disciplinary orientation, judges have
developed their own approaches to drawing the line between reasonable
physical discipline and unlawful physical abuse. These approaches vary from
state to state and judge to judge. Nevertheless, a careful analysis of the relevant
cases shows that, in general, courts consider many of the same factors as CPS
does, including the degree and severity of the child’s injury, the child’s real and
developmental age, the manner of discipline, and whether a pattern of abuse
(chronicity) is present. Importantly, though, this analysis also demonstrates that
courts are more likely than CPS to consider parent-focused factors, such as the

90. See supra note 47.
91. Because CPS professionals often have long-term working relationships with the particular trialcourt judges assigned to review their maltreatment decisions, accommodations may be made on both
sides, but especially by CPS. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. CPS may also be inhibited
by states’ sometimes-stingy procedural requirements for appeals.
92. See, e.g., In re interest of J.P., 692 N.E.2d 338, 346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (“We are guided by the
Illinois Administrative Rules . . . [which suggest] considering such factors as the child’s age, the severity
of the injury, the location of the injury, whether an instrument was used, and the pattern and chronicity
of similar incidents of harm to the child.”).
93. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 77 (2007); see also Sokol v. Kansas Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab.
Serv., 981 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Kan. 1999) (“[I]n reviewing questions of law, the trial court may substitute
its judgment for that of the administrative agency, although ordinarily the court will give great
deference to the interpretation of statutes and regulations of the enforcing agency.”).
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parent’s right to use physical discipline and the parent’s motivation for doing so
in a particular case, and less likely than CPS to consider an injury’s emotional
and developmental sequelae. Indeed, depending on the jurisdiction, these
parent-focused factors may predominate.
1. Factors Common to Judicial and CPS Decisionmaking
a. Severity of injury. Consistent with state statutes that typically define
physical abuse in terms of harm or injury to the child, courts drawing the line
between reasonable corporal punishment and unlawful physical abuse focus
heavily on the degree and severity of the child’s physical injury. The level of
harm or injury necessary for an act of physical discipline to constitute abuse
depends largely on each state’s statutory definition of abuse. Courts commonly
consider such factors as whether medical treatment was required, how much
pain the child experienced, and whether the injury resulted in disfigurement or
impairment.94 Courts are reluctant to find that bruising alone is severe enough
to constitute physical abuse.95 In fact, some courts have specifically rejected CPS
rules and regulations that permit a finding of abuse when a child experiences a
bruise lasting more than twenty-four hours.96 In general, courts appear more
willing to find physical abuse when punishment results in multiple or very large
bruises, bruises with a deep or intense color, bruises lasting a week or more,
bruises that are especially painful, or bruises on a location other than the child’s
buttocks.97 At least some courts demand more before they are willing to find

94. See, e.g., T.G. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 927 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that evidence was insufficient to establish abuse when physical discipline resulted in bruising
but the agency failed to produce evidence that the bruises required medical attention); In re Miles, 2002
WL 1065704, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 22, 2002) (per curiam) (holding that evidence was insufficient
to establish abuse when a mother’s fiancé bit her nine-year-old child because there was no evidence
“that acute pain resulted of any lasting duration to result in substantial suffering, or that [the pain]
lasted for an extended period of time or was intractable”). But see In re F.S., 806 N.E.2d 1087, 1094–95
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (explaining that there is no requirement that injuries necessitate medical treatment
in order to constitute abuse).
95. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Serv. v. Caldwell, 832 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992)
(explaining that evidence of bruising as a single factor “standing alone and applied as a litmus test,
without consideration of all the attendant circumstances, is [not] an appropriate measure to be used in
all cases for determining whether an allegation of abuse is to be sustained”).
96. For example, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected a CPS rule that reddening of the skin lasting for
twenty-four hours or more is a physical injury per se. Hildreth v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Serv., 550
N.W.2d 157, 158–60 (Iowa 1996) (explaining that “welts, bruises, or similar markings are not physical
injuries per se but may be and frequently are evidence from which the existence of physical injury can
be found”). Florida courts have also rejected an agency policy requiring investigators to confirm reports
of abuse when bruises are visible twenty-four hours after the discipline is administered. B.R. v. Dep’t of
Health and Rehab. Serv., 558 So. 2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); see also, e.g., In re O.C., 934
So. 2d 623, 627–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that a four-inch bruise on a child’s buttocks was
insufficient to support a finding of physical abuse and noting that “case law has established . . . that a
single incident of a serious bruise on the buttock of a child, perhaps caused by corporal punishment,
will not support a finding of dependency” and that “some evidence of a pattern of excessive corporal
punishment or a single punishment resulting in a more serious injury is required”).
97. Compare Cobble v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Social Serv., 719 N.E.2d 500, 503, 508 (Mass. 1999)
(finding evidence insufficient to establish abuse when a father disciplined his son by striking him on the
buttocks with a belt resulting in temporary red marks that lasted approximately ten minutes), with In re
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that the requisite “serious” injury has occurred. For example, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals held that bruises on a child’s arm and upper
buttocks lasting for several days were insufficient to establish that the child,
who had been beaten with a belt, was abused. The court explained that abuse
involves “an injury more severe than a bruise as a result of a spanking.”98 And it
provided as examples of incidents and injuries that did pass muster: choking,
hitting with fists and glass objects, pulling out hair, and burning.99
b. The age and developmental stage of the child. The cases suggest that courts
are more inclined to classify a disciplinary measure as abuse when the act is
administered against a young child or one with physical or mental disabilities.100
The courts’ consideration of these characteristics can be explained in two ways.
First, a spanking administered against a young child or a child with physical
disabilities may cause a more-serious physical injury and more-serious longterm consequences to emotional development than the same spanking
administered against an older or physically healthy child.101 In this sense, the age
and condition of a child is simply part of a court’s consideration of the degree
and severity of the child’s injury. Second, a young child or a child with a mental
or emotional disability may lack the capacity to understand the purpose of the
discipline or appreciate its deterrent effect.102 A spanking that has no
disciplinary value because the child lacks the capacity to understand its purpose
is more likely to be unreasonable or excessive.
c. Manner of discipline. Courts often consider how much force and how
many strikes parents employ when they administer physical discipline, as well as

L.T.R., 639 S.E.2d 122, 126 (finding physical abuse when stepfather hit his four-year-old stepson with a
brush causing a “dark, six-inch bruise, which lasted well over one week, on his right thigh” which
caused visible discomfort several days later), and J.S. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 565 A.2d 862, 864 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989) (finding abuse of a five-year-old child when spanking caused “black and blue marks
over her entire buttocks area causing severe pain”), and S.C. Dep’t of Social Serv. v. Father and
Mother, 366 S.E.2d 40, 41 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (finding abuse when a thirteen-year-old child sustained
“purple bruises covering almost the entire back of her left thigh and a part of the back of her right leg,
extending to her knee”).
98. In re C.B., J.B., Th.B., & Ti.B., 636 S.E.2d 336, 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
99. Id.
100. This inclination is consistent with recent moves in some jurisdictions to classify all physical
discipline of children under a certain age as per se unreasonable. In 2004, the Canadian Supreme Court
prohibited corporal punishment for children under the age of two or over the age of twelve. Canandian
Found. for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, 2004 SCC 4 (Can.).
Additionally, a California legislator sponsored a bill that would have made spanking a child under the
age of three a misdemeanor but abandoned it due to a lack of political support. Jesse McKinley,
Lawmaker Ends Effort to Make Spanking a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2007, at A15.
101. See, e.g., In re Rogers, 1989 WL 98423, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1989) (emphasizing that
paddling with a board could “create pain that would be unbearable or nearly so to a two-year-old
child”).
102. See Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. v. R.C., 2007 S.W.3d WL 416776, at *7 (Ark. Feb. 8,
2007) (finding abuse when a four-year-old child suffering from cerebral palsy received a spanking
causing eight to ten bruises); Lovan C. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 860 A.2d 1283, 1290 (Conn.
Ct. App. 2004) (relevant factors include “the amount of force used and the child’s age, size and ability
to understand the punishment”).
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whether they use an object such as a belt or paddle.103 The cases suggest that
courts view with more suspicion a parent who uses extreme force to strike a
child repeatedly with a paddle or belt than one who swats a child a couple of
times with an open hand; correspondingly, such discipline is more likely to be
found to exceed the bounds of reasonableness.104 To some extent, these factors
simply correspond to the degree or severity of harm inflicted on the child. As
one court pointed out, an object may create a barrier between the parent and
child and prevent the parent from realizing how hard he is striking the child.105
Uncontrolled, forceful striking or the use of an object to strike a child also
might increase the risk of severe injury if the child squirms or otherwise moves
as the discipline is being administered.106 Interestingly, there is some evidence
that parents choose to discipline with an object instead of a hand because they
believe doing so is less harmful to the child. For example, a parent may choose
to use a spoon or another object to administer a spanking because doing so
makes it less likely that their children will perceive hitting with hands as an
acceptable way to solve problems.107 Some courts also infer something about the
parent’s motive or intent from the parent’s choice of disciplinary method.
Whereas courts may view injuries resulting from a measured, restrained
spanking as just the “regrettable result” of well-intentioned corporal
punishment, more-extreme methods of punishment are viewed suspiciously
because they suggest that a parent actually intends to injure his child.108

103. See, e.g., In re Mercer, 2005 WL 914671, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2005) (considering the
“[n]ature of manner of the discipline administered, and the measure of discipline”).
104. See In re F.W., 634 N.E.2d 1123, 1129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (urging parents to “understand that a
swat on a child’s buttocks with an open hand and the ‘paddling’ of a child with belts, cords, or ropes are
intrinsically distinct exercises of corporal punishment” and warning that “parents using boards, belts,
cords, or ropes as weapons to inflict corporal punishment may encounter an unwillingness on the part
of DCFS and the courts to regard their conduct as reasonable”). But see In re J.P., 692 N.E.2d 338, 346
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (“[T]he use of an object, especially when the court finds that the object was not
‘terribly offensive’ or ‘heinous’ should not blind a court to the many other factors which should and
must be considered when weighing the evidence.”).
105. Hildreth v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Serv., 550 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Iowa 1996) (“The laws of physics
are such that when even a moderate degree of force is administered through an instrument that makes
contact with only a small area of the body, the pressure visited upon that point may be more than will
reasonably be anticipated.”).
106. See City of Philadelphia v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 767 A.2d 10, 11 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (A
mother bruised her son’s forearm and back with a pool stick when he tried to shield himself from her
strikes to the buttocks).
107. One mother told a child-services caseworker that she used a wooden spoon to discipline her
child because she believed it was wrong to hit with the hand, which should represent love. In re J.P., 692
N.E.2d 338, 339 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). Another parent explained that he preferred to use an object
instead of his hand because he did not want to teach his children that “the way to solve things is by
hitting with the hand.” In re B.B., 598 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).
108. See, e.g., P.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 801 A.2d 478, 487 (Pa. 2002) (holding that an agency
must show that a parent’s conduct in administering corporal punishment was a “gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the same situation” to establish that
injuries inflicted as a result of corporal punishment constitute abuse; the court found that the decision
to use a belt with a buckle was not such a gross deviation). In an earlier case, however, a Pennsylvania
court held that a mother abused her daughter when she continued to strike her daughter with a belt as
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d. Pattern of abuse or chronicity. Courts frequently consider whether an act
of physical discipline is an isolated event or part of a larger pattern of arguably
unreasonable discipline.109 If the individual injuries are relatively minor, a
pattern, or chronicity, may cause them to be classified as abuse.110 Courts may
place importance on a pattern of abuse because they fear that an escalation of
violence in the future could put the child at risk. Though courts seem less likely
than CPS workers explicitly to consider a child’s risk of future harm or injury,
courts’ emphasis on the history of unreasonable physical discipline in the
household indicates some concern for the child’s safety in the event that the
child remains in the home.
2. Nonphysical Sequelae and Parent-Focused Factors
a. Emotional and developmental effects. Unlike CPS, which as an institution
is increasingly incorporating the emotional and developmental effect of physical
injuries into their assessment whether a particular incident of corporal
punishment is abuse, courts appear rarely to consider the possibility that
physical discipline may be emotionally or psychologically damaging to the child.
A review of appellate-court decisions suggests that lower-court records contain
little or no information about the emotional and developmental effects of
physical discipline on the child.111 Even when these effects are recognized,
however, courts are still likely to give them very little weight.112 One judge has

her daughter ran up the stairs. B.J.K. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 773 A.2d 1271 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
See also In re Peter G., 6 A.D.3d 201, 206 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (finding physical discipline reasonable
absent a “showing that the father’s actions were extreme or unnecessarily degrading or prompted by
rage or administered solely for self-gratification”).
109. See, e.g., In re O.C., 934 So. 2d 623, 627–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (requiring either
“evidence of a pattern of excessive punishment” or a more-serious single incident to constitute abuse).
110. Id.
111. Only a handful of the cases reviewed contained any references to emotional or developmental
effects. See, e.g., In re D.C., 596 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1979) (per curiam) (recounting testimony from a
psychiatric social worker indicating that the home situation was causing major psychological problems
for the child); In re T.F., 2005 WL 288996, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2005) (recounting testimony from
a counselor indicating that “children appeared to be happy with the mother”); In re S.K., 564 A.2d 1382
(D.C. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam) (recounting expert testimony that the child’s mental illness was
exacerbated by physical discipline); O.S. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 821 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2002) (recounting evidence that child was self-mutilated). Illinois courts appear to consider
the emotional and psychological effects more frequently than do courts in other states. See In re F.W.,
634 N.E.2d 1123, 1129 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that it is appropriate for the court to consider the
“psychological effects of the discipline on the child”). It is impossible without doing a thorough search
of case files to determine the information lower courts had at their disposal. These files are difficult to
locate and, depending on the case, may be sealed. A review of appellate decisions is a good substitute
for this search because they are based on evidence included in the record below. The experience of
parties to and judges sitting on cases in the lower courts is consistent with our reading of these appellate
decisions. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
112. In re BB, 598 N.W. 2d 312, 318 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999) (Sackett, C.J., concurring specially)
(departing from the majority’s conclusion that excessive corporal punishment caused a child to adopt
his parents’ aggressive approach to problem-solving because “this is not a conclusion to reach without
any statistical evidence” and “experience ha[d] shown [the judge] that even young men who are not
spanked at home fight at school”).

COLEMAN, DODGE, & CAMPBELL

134

10/25/2010 12:50:15 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 73:107

surmised that this bias is because judges in general lack the expertise to
evaluate evidence related to the emotional or psychological impact of physical
discipline on a child.113 Whatever the case, interviews with CPS professionals in
one North Carolina county suggest that emotional- and developmental-impact
evidence rarely makes it into the record notwithstanding its importance because
neither the lawyers (for the state or the parents) nor the judges involved are
interested in these facts; they simply want to know the circumstances in which
the immediate physical injury occurred and the relevant medical details.114
b. Parent’s motivation. Related to the circumstances in which the injury
occurred, and in contrast with the practice of at least some CPS professionals,
courts often consider a parent’s motivation for administering physical discipline
when they evaluate the reasonableness of the disciplinary act. Specifically, some
courts consider whether the disciplinary act was “rendered necessary” by the
child’s actions.115 This approach requires courts to evaluate the nature and
gravity of the child’s behavior and the parent’s attempts to address the behavior
without resorting to physical discipline.116 The child’s age and developmental
stage should also be relevant to this inquiry because punishment is pointless
(and only potentially harmful) if the child is unable to appreciate its intended
lesson. At bottom, the parental-motivation inquiry suggests that courts—unlike
some CPS professionals—are not strictly focused on physical harm to the child.
They are often willing to view physical discipline, even physical discipline that
causes minor physical injury to the child, as reasonable, provided the parent’s

113. Cindy S. Lederman, Healing in the Place of Last Resort: The Role of the Dependency Court
Within Community-Based Efforts to Prevent Child Maltreatment, in PREVENTING CHILD
MALTREATMENT: COMMUNITY APPROACHES 172, 173 (Kenneth A. Dodge & Doriane Lambelet
Coleman eds., 2009).
114. Interviews by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with county CPS frontline
investigator and director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP).
115. People ex rel. C.F., 708 N.W.2d 313, 317 (S.D. 2005). South Dakota employs a two-pronged
analysis to determine whether an act of discipline is unlawful or reasonable. The first prong asks
whether the “corrective measure utilized was ‘rendered necessary’ by the child’s actions,” while the
second prong asks “whether the force used was ‘reasonable in manner and moderate in degree.’” Id.
Connecticut and Ohio also appear to use a version of this two-pronged analysis. See Lovan C. v. Dep’t
of Children and Families, 86 Conn. App. 290, 299 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (“In a substantiation of abuse
hearing, if it is shown that a child has sustained a non-accidental injury as a result of parent
administered corporal punishment, the hearing officer must determine whether the punishment was
reasonable and whether the parent believed the punishment was necessary to maintain discipline or to
promote the child’s welfare.”); In re Horton, 2004 WL 2674562, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2004)
(determining whether a child is abused requires an inquiry into “(1) the excessiveness (or lack thereof)
and necessity (or lack thereof) of the corporal punishment appellant inflicted, and (2) whether the
punishment created a substantial risk of serious physical harm”). An opinion issued by the California
Attorney General also suggested that this is the proper analysis. 80 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. No. 97-416
(1997) (“[T]he punishment must be necessary and not excessive in relation to the individual
circumstances.”).
116. See In re T.A., 663 N.W.2d 225, 230 (S.D. 2003) (finding physical discipline unnecessary
because the boy’s “parents failed to intervene in any manner before resorting to spanking” and did not
attempt alternative forms of discipline).
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disciplinary act was a legitimate attempt to correct the child’s misbehavior.117 If
the evidence suggests that a parent was instead acting viciously out of anger or
cruelty, however, courts are not willing to afford parents the same discretion.118
Many courts that do not explicitly evaluate the “necessity” of the disciplinary
act still take into account the parent’s motivation by considering whether the
parent employed physical discipline in a manner indicative of her desire to help,
not harm, the child.119 Specifically, courts consider whether the parentadministered discipline in a controlled manner, whether the parent was angry
when he or she administered the discipline, and whether any evidence suggests
a malicious intent.120
c. Parent’s right to use physical discipline. Finally, when evaluating whether a
finding of abuse is warranted, courts commonly refer to a parent’s right to
administer reasonable physical discipline.121 The courts’ explicit recognition of
this right as part of an attempt to draw the line between physical abuse and
reasonable physical discipline suggests that—unlike some CPS agencies and
professionals, who view their role primarily as saving children from their
parents122—courts are focused either on simultaneously protecting children
and preserving parents’ disciplinary autonomy, or, in some cases, primarily on
the latter.123
117. See M.O. v. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Serv., 575 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per
curiam) (emphasizing that the discipline employed by parents was part of a therapeutic plan developed
with the help of an outside expert).
118. See, e.g., In re Maurice S., 1994 WL 149549, at *3 (Neb. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1994) (finding abuse
when father was angry at his son and “specifically ordered [him] to remove his sweater to ensure the
punishments were painful” and when nothing suggested that the child was “defiant or otherwise
uncontrollable or incorrigible”).
119. See, e.g., Raboin v. N.D. Dep’t of Human Serv., 552 N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 1996) (noting that
parents only used corporal punishment as a last resort and in a structured manner); State ex rel. L.P.,
981 P.2d 848 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (considering whether parent’s action was a good faith effort to
maintain discipline or, rather, a malicious intent to cause harm); Ables v. Rivero, 2003 WL 356446, at
*6 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2003) (explaining that it is unreasonable to use physical discipline for the
“exhibition of uncontrolled passion”).
120. See cases cited supra note 119.
121. See, e.g., In re J.P., 692 N.E.2d 338, 345 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998) (“It is clear that a parent has the
‘right’ to corporally discipline his or her child, a right derived from our constitutional right to privacy.
But this right, like any other, must be exercised in a ‘reasonable’ manner.”) (citations omitted).
122. Interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman, with a county frontline
investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP) (describing the goal as helping
families and explaining that classifying an injury as maltreatment provides the basis to accomplish this
goal; emphasizing that CPS exists to protect children, not parents’ rights); Doriane Lambelet Coleman,
Innovations in Child Maltreatment Prevention: Resolving the Tension Between Effective Assistance and
Violations of Privacy, in PREVENTING CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 113 at 156, 158 (noting that
“the social work community has a long history of thinking about itself as engaged in the business of
‘child saving’ and particularly about its prophylactic interventions in the lives of children and families as
‘helping’”).
123. Appellate court judges in particular seem to be inclined toward privileging parents’ rights
above harm to the child, as they are more likely, certainly more so than CPS professionals, to interpret
a statutory requirement of physical injury or serious physical injury to require egregious harm or
damage to the child. See, e.g., In re C.B., J.B., Th.B., & Ti.B., 636 S.E.2d 336, 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006)
(providing as illustrations of incidents and outcomes meeting the definition a parent who chokes,
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III
THE GOVERNING PARADIGMS FOR DECISIONMAKING
The legal actors responsible for determining where and how to draw the line
between reasonable and unlawful corporal punishment—CPS agents and
courts—are influenced by one of two paradigms, or by a more or less ad hoc
combination. The first of these paradigms reflects parental-autonomy norms,
and the second, scientific knowledge about the circumstances that cause
children harm. The extent to which one or another of the paradigms governs
the approach of particular individuals or institutions appears at least in part to
reflect political or personal orientation, disciplinary training, or both.124 In view
of our prescriptive project in part IV, which seeks intentionally to reconcile
norms and knowledge and to propose policy reforms that reflect that
reconciliation, this part lays the groundwork for effective multi- and
interdisciplinary engagement by describing, first from the relevant disciplinary
perspectives, the nature and significance of each of these approaches.
A. Parental-Autonomy Norms
Parental-autonomy norms reflect society’s widely held view that parents
have the right to raise their children as they see fit, without outside interference
from the government or others. Described variously as “parental autonomy,”
“parents’ rights,” and “family privacy,”125 these norms—incorporated in longstanding American political philosophy, constitutional theory, and law—
provide that a metaphorical (closed) circle or geographic boundary surrounds
the family, in which parents are sovereigns and children, subjects of their
punches, and burns a child and who pulls out her hair, and rejecting as insufficient CPS’s evidence of
beatings with a belt causing bruises on the buttocks and elsewhere on the body that last for several days
coupled with the child’s fear of returning home to the offending parent).
124. For a useful summary of the long-standing collaboration and clash between social workers and
the law in this area, see GIOVANNONI & BECERRA, supra note 6 at 66–69. Specifically, id. at 66:
“Together, the social welfare agencies and legal system constituted a curious commingling of the
exercise of legal authority and the rendering of social service, with much overlap and blurring of roles.
That tensions should arise in any system with such unclear role definitions is inevitable.”; id. at 67
(noting that, early on, “[s]ocial workers came under criticism for their lack of knowledge about the law
and legal procedures”); id. at 68 (suggesting that proponents of law and social work may be “more
polarized” today than in the early twentieth century, and that “the potential for polarization . . . inheres
in the conflicting interests of the parties in the situation”); and id. at 68–69 (describing the conflicting
interests as being, on the one hand and for social workers, saving children from bad parents even when
the evidence to justify this does not yet meet legal muster, and on the other hand and for the law,
protecting parents’ rights to the custody of their children).
125. James G. Dwyer, Parental Entitlement and Corporal Punishment, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
189, 194-206 (Spring 2010); Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1210–11 (1999) (family privacy means the right to freedom from state
interference that belongs to the family as a unit or entity, rather than to its included individuals);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1247, 1254
(1999) (family privacy is essentially the same thing as parental autonomy since, “[w]hen we adopt a
theoretical framework that endows any ‘unit’ of persons with ‘autonomy,’ or a ‘right’ to be free of state
intervention, in practice, we are conferring unregulated authority on the dominant member within this
closed community of persons”).
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sovereignty.126 Within this scheme, parents have both the right to physical
custody of their children and the right to make decisions for and about them
and their welfare.127 The latter is part of a bundle of adult decisionmaking rights
that are known especially in constitutional jurisprudence as decisional
autonomy.128
When discipline is appropriate and how it is meted out are considered to be
well within parents’ decisional autonomy. As one court explained, “The duty to
discipline the child carries with it the right to chastise and to prescribe a course
of conduct designed for the child’s development and welfare. This in turn
demands that the parents be given a wide sphere of discretion.”129 Although the
United States Supreme Court has never had occasion to rule on whether
corporal punishment is included among parents’ federal constitutional rights,
this disciplinary option is well-established under state law.130 Specifically, states
have long provided parents with an exception to tort- and criminal-law
prohibitions against physical assaults when they can establish a disciplinary
motive for the assault and when the assault itself is “reasonable.”131 Twentiethcentury case law is thus replete with holdings like this one: “A parent has the
right to punish a child within the bounds of moderation and reason, so long as
he or she does it for the welfare of the child.”132 The states’ approach has its
126. Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Family as a System: A Preliminary Sketch, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 537,
541–42 (1996) (recalling colonial history that described the family as “distinct from that other entity,
the state, . . . [which] must be given some decisional space,” and describing a married couple as
“form[ing] a precinct that stands apart from and is ordinarily closed to state authority”); id. at 546
(rejecting the conventional idea of “the family . . . as an island or refuge”).
127. Coleman, Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, supra note 3, at 546–48.
128. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202–
05 (1998) (describing the constitutional concept of decisional privacy).
129. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 656 (Wash. 1952)(en banc.).
130. See supra II.A (describing states’ statutory privilege). State law is significant in this context
because its traditional forms typically influence the contours of constitutional doctrine. Coleman, Legal
Ethics of Pediatric Research, supra note 3 at 548–49. In other words, even though the Supreme Court
has not decided the question, given long-standing state-law tradition, it is generally assumed that if the
Court did have occasion to do so, it would rule that corporal punishment is within the bounds of
parental autonomy. See also Davidson, supra note 2, at 406 (“The United States Supreme Court has
recognized the parental right reasonably to discipline children by stating, ‘the statist notion that
governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and
neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.’”) (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603
(1979)); Leonard P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
983, 991 n.48 (1995–1996) (discussing the Supreme Court cases that, read together, support the
assumption that parents have a constitutional right to use corporal punishment as a form of discipline).
131. See Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233, 1242–43 (D.C. 2002) (explaining that “the basic
conception of the parental discipline defense” requires a “genuine disciplinary purpose” and the use of
only “moderate” or “reasonable” force); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147 (1965) (providing
that “[a] parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement
upon his child as he reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education”);
Edwards, supra note 130, at 983–84 (explaining the disciplinary exception to battery law).
132. Edwards, supra note 130, at 997 (describing the holding in Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 44
S.E.2d 419 (Va. 1947)). See also, e.g., Gillett v. Gillett, 335 P.2d 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (noting that a
parent “may administer reasonable punishment with impunity, but when he exceeds that limit and does
so willfully he commits a battery and is civilly liable for the consequences”); Diehl v. Commonwealth,
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origins in “the Colonial period, [when] . . . [corporal] punishment was thought
to be a ‘desirable and necessary instrument of restraint upon sin and
immorality,’ as well as having a regenerative effect on the child’s character.”133
This view derived in turn from traditional English doctrine, which holds that a
parent “may lawfully correct his child, being under age, in a reasonable manner,
for this is for the benefit of his education.”134 Modern maltreatment law has
adopted this common-law exception.135
In general, parental autonomy is viewed as being good for society, good for
parents, and good for children. Political philosophy and constitutional theory
teach that parental autonomy is good for society because the family is
considered to be the fundamental—as in first and foundational—social unit of
society. This is the concept of the family as a village within a town, within a
county, within a state, within the country; the village being primarily and in the
first instance responsible for bringing up the young to become well-adjusted,
productive individuals and citizens.136 Parental autonomy is also said to be good
for society because children need to be raised by some adult(s), and neither the
state itself nor any other individual or group of adults can replace parents as
“first best caretakers,”137 and because society’s interest in the perpetuation of
heterogenic democracy is best fulfilled when an ideologically diverse group of
individuals raises the children.138 Parental autonomy is viewed as being good for

385 S.E.2d 228, 230 (Va. App. Ct. 1989) (“[W]hile a parent has the right to discipline his or her child the
punishment must be within the bounds of moderation. If the parent exceeds due moderation, he or she
becomes criminally liable.”).
133. Edwards, supra note 130, at 988 (“Since a child’s original nature was considered evil, corporal
punishment enabled the child to become a fit person, and any failure was seen as a matter of
inadequate application.”). Modern thought on the need for and benefits of corporal punishment is
remarkably unchanged. See, e.g., id. at 990 (explaining the modern view that “the principle effect of
corporal punishment is that children learn to obey and respect authority. Further, it builds character,
prevents bad behavior from reoccurring, and improves discipline.”).
134. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *542.
135. See supra II.A .
136. See Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 965
(1993) (noting the historical construction of the family as “a little commonwealth”); HERMAN
HUMPHREY, DOMESTIC EDUCATION (1840), reprinted in 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 351–52 (Robert Bremner ed., 1970) (“Every family is a little state, or
empire within itself . . . . Every Father is the constituted head and ruler of his household. God has made
him the supreme earthly legislator over his children . . . .”); William E. McCurdy, Torts Between
Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1076–77 (1930) (noting that the family is a
“domestic government” and that “the head of the family is clothed with broad authority . . . similar to
that of a sovereign”); see also LAURENCE THOMAS, THE FAMILY AND POLITICAL SELF 83–129
(arguing from Rousseau that “‘[t]he family is the first model of political societies’”).
137. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401–03 (1923) (discussing the downsides of alternative childrearing models); DAVIS ET AL., supra note 10, at 1 (describing the law’s view of parents as children’s
“‘first best’ caretakers”); Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3 at 536–37 (using this principle in
the context of child welfare investigations).
138. Dailey, supra note 136, at 959 (“[T]he family acts as an important institutional check on the
power of the state to mold citizens in its own image.”); id. at 996 (“[P]arental authority . . . is necessary
for the development of responsible individuals who have been raised with a sense of belonging to
distinct and diverse moral traditions.”).
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parents because it honors the “natural bonds of affection” that tie them to their
children and also because it compensates them for taking on the responsibilities
of parenting.139 Finally, parental autonomy is viewed as being good for children
because, among the adults and institutions that might be imagined as caregivers,
parents, guided by their natural bonds of affection, are most likely to take the
best care of their own children and to do the best job raising them to be
successful adults.140 That aspect of parental autonomy that sees the family as
sovereign territory is specifically viewed as being good for children because,
when parent and child are bonded, interference by outsiders to the relationship
harms their emotional and developmental well-being.141
The theories that support parental autonomy have changed significantly
over time. Throughout the nineteenth century, children were generally
considered to be one with or the property of their parents (generally of their
fathers).142 By the end of the twentieth century, however, these unity and
property models of the parent–child relationship were considered anachronistic.
Today, children are generally believed to be proper subjects of individualism,
albeit with an evolving capacity for mature, thoughtful decisionmaking.143 The
concept of the family as sovereign territory protected against interference by a
circle of privacy has not changed, although the right of the state to break the

139. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (“[T]he Court has emphasized the paramount
interest in the welfare of children and has noted that the rights of parents are a counterpart of the
responsibilities they have assumed.”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Parents generally,
‘have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional
obligations.’”) (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)); see also GIOVANNONI &
BECERRA, supra note 6, at 34–35 (quoting Blackstone, who wrote that “[t]he duty of parents for the
maintenance of their children is a principle of natural law; an obligation . . . laid down on them not only
by nature herself . . . in bringing them into the world: for they would be in the highest manner injurious
to their issue, if they only gave their children life, that they might afterwards see them perish.”);
Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 297–98 (1988) (describing the
traditional view of “parenthood as exchange”).
140. As Emily Buss has written,
[A] legal system that shows strong deference to parents’ child-rearing decisions serves
children well. Parents’ strong emotional attachment to their children and considerable
knowledge of their particular needs make parents the child-specific experts most qualified to
assess and pursue their children’s best interests in most circumstances. In contrast, the state’s
knowledge of and commitment to any particular child is relatively thin. A scheme of strong
constitutional rights shields the parent expert from the intrusive second-guessing of the less
expert state.
“Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 647 (2002). See also DAVIS et al., supra note 10, at 1 (noting that
the arrangement established under the doctrine of parental autonomy is “assumed . . . [to] serve both
the interests of children and of society”).
141. See Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3, at 520–21, 536–37; JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 19–20, and passim (1973) (arguing that interference in
or disruption of a bonded parent–child relationship can cause harm to the child).
142. Edwards, supra note 130, at 986–89 (discussing this theoretical background and its application
in the corporal punishment context); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A
Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 313, 313 (1998).
143. Coleman, Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, supra note 3, at 615–16; GIOVANNONI &
BECERRA, supra note 6 at 32–36.
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circle and to enter into the family to protect its vulnerable members has
increased substantially.144
Legal doctrine has changed correspondingly. Parents can no longer lease
their children’s services out to others for the duration of their childhoods, nor
choose whether or not to school them, nor impose what in some cases once
amounted to a parentally inflicted death penalty for disrespect and other
important transgressions.145 The boundaries of family privacy are now drawn at
a point that balances parents’ interests and rights with those of children and the
state. Thus, parents’ rights to force children to work for hire have been curtailed
according to their developmental capacity for such work and to assure that they
have the time to go to school and to rest so that they are at least competent at
that enterprise.146 Parents’ right to choose where their children are educated is
intact, but gone is their right not to educate their children at all, because
children need an education to be successful citizens.147 Finally, although “[i]t is
clear that a parent has the ‘right’ to corporally discipline his or her child, a right
derived from our constitutional right to privacy[,] . . . this right . . . must be
exercised in a ‘reasonable’ manner.”148 Reasonableness has always been the
standard, of course, but because its legal iteration is tied to social norms, as
these norms evolve to countenance less harm and, at least in some
circumstances, to narrow the forms of acceptable corporal punishment, parental
autonomy and the boundaries of family privacy have been correspondingly
reduced.149
144. See, e.g., Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3, at 533 (describing “the need for the state
to intrude into the circle of family privacy when a child likely needs to be rescued”); David D. Meyer,
The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 529-30 (2008) (discussing “the circle of
family privacy protection” in the current context).
145. Coleman, Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, supra note 3, at 615–17.
146. DAVIS et al., supra note 10, at 16–17, 32.
147. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (“The power of the state to compel attendance
at some school . . . is not questioned.”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925):
No question is raised concerning the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools, to
inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of
proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic
disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that
nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.
148. In re J.P., 692 N.E.2d 338, 345 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998).
149. Murray A. Straus, Prevalence, Societal Causes, and Trends in Corporal Punishment by Parents
in World Perspective, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 22-29 (Spring 2010) (explaining that social
science research has documented recent rapid and marked changes in social norms and cultural
acceptance regarding the frequency and manner of corporal punishment of children in both American
society and worldwide); Edwards, supra note 130, at 985, 1000, 1008, 1019 (describing evolving attitudes
about corporal punishment, parental rights, and child abuse, and noting specifically that “American
society has tolerated less and less severe forms of corporal punishment during the last generation.”).
Two criteria traditionally have informed the reasonableness of parental behavior and, thus, the legal
limits of parental autonomy. One criterion is the degree of harm to the child. See supra II.C.1.a and
infra III.B. The other criterion is cultural norms as these evolve over time. Regardless or independent
of degree of harm to the child, parental autonomy tends to be respected as long as a parental practice
does not stretch too far beyond culturally specific notions of normativeness. Norms are defined both by
statistical frequency and cultural tolerance. Thus, parental autonomy is allowed if the practice is not too
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Lawyers and the judiciary, particularly appellate judges, are well versed in
the legal doctrine of parental autonomy and its philosophical underpinnings.
Indeed, if the question before the court involves, in some respect, a parent’s
right to make a child-rearing decision, the constitutional doctrine of parental
autonomy will and should be front and center. For the court, this doctrine
embodies “first principles” and as such is the law that applies to the case. This is
true whether the question is presented as a federal constitutional claim150 or as a
state-law claim that itself reflects this constitutional norm.151 Finally, because
federal constitutional law formally preempts all other laws—including
government-issued regulations, policies, or protocols—inconsistent perspectives
on the factors that should influence where and how the line between reasonable
corporal punishment and abuse is drawn are largely irrelevant to the legal
process.152
For present purposes, this means that lawyers and the judiciary will always
be inclined to test CPS interventions designed to protect the welfare of the child
against the right of family privacy or parental autonomy, and they will generally
read child-abuse definitions and corporal-punishment exceptions through this
lens. Thus, for example, judges in jurisdictions where the governing statute
requires a finding of “serious” abuse before punishment is unlawful may read
“serious” most seriously, to require that CPS show that the injury was lifethreatening or at least permanently disfiguring. In such jurisdictions, “mere”
bruising, even bruising lasting for several days and in circumstances where the
child was afraid to return home, might be an insufficient basis to allow CPS to
breach the circle of family privacy.153 Relatedly, CPS interventions based in

unusual; that is, as long as the behavior is also practiced by at least some other accepted members of the
society. Official tolerance may also increase the statistical normativeness of a corporal-punishment
practice; tolerance and normativeness undoubtedly reciprocally influence each other. Corporal
punishment to the buttocks, for example, is allowed partly because it is statistically normative. In the
United States, the majority of children between ages two and five have been corporally punished, even
though parents report using corporal punishment relatively rarely, peaking at one and a half times per
month when children are two years old and decreasing to less than once per month by the time children
are twelve years old. M.A. Straus and J.H. Stewart, Corporal Punishment by American Parents:
National Data on Prevalence, Chronicity, Severity, and Duration, in Relation to Child and Family
Characteristics, 2 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 5, 59–60 (1999). Male circumcision is also
statistically normative, even though it causes the sort of harm to the child that would otherwise qualify
as abuse. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: Multicultural Sensitivity and
Americanization, 47 DUKE L.J. 717, 757 n.185 (1998); Dwyer, supra note 125, at 201-04. In contrast,
corporal punishment to the genitals would receive much closer scrutiny by authorities simply because it
is less common, whether or not it causes actual harm to the child.
150. A claim that the state has violated a parent’s constitutional right of parental autonomy would
be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and, if the claim was religiously grounded, also under
the First.
151. A claim that the state has violated a parent’s right to use corporal punishment to discipline a
child would be brought under the common-law or statutory-discipline exception relevant to the
proceedings in issue, that is, tort law, criminal law, or civil-maltreatment law.
152. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 392 (3d ed. 2006).
153. See, e.g., In re C.B. J.B., Th.B., & Ti.B., 636 S.E.2d 336, 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).

COLEMAN, DODGE, & CAMPBELL

142

10/25/2010 12:50:15 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 73:107

concerns that are perceived to be inconsistent with the right of family privacy or
parental autonomy are not likely to be upheld. It appears, for example, that
judges tend to reject as unlawful interventions that rest (or appear to rest)
primarily on CPS concerns about the child’s emotional and developmental
welfare, preferring instead to focus on the physical harm caused by the injury at
issue in the case.154
Florida family-court judge Cindy Lederman has suggested that judges’
tendency to focus on physical harm is due at least in part to the fact that most
are neither trained to appreciate the correlation between physical injury and
emotional and developmental welfare nor provided by litigants with evidencebased science that would permit them to evaluate claims of this sort.155
Moreover, most litigants probably do not provide the basis for courts to
understand how this kind of evidence might actually be compatible with the
right of family privacy and parental autonomy, particularly with its boundaries.
In other words, litigants do not appear to work systematically to make the
evidence of emotional and developmental welfare relevant to the courts, given
the courts’ particular orientation and doctrinal constraints. As a result, it
sometimes appears that CPS intervenes in the family to protect a child based on
a combination of concerns, including about the child’s emotional and
developmental welfare, only to have the court reject the intervention because
the physical injury is viewed as insufficient (standing alone) to permit it.
B. Scientific Knowledge of Harm to the Child
Beyond parental-autonomy norms, a reasonable manner of corporal
punishment is defined scientifically by the degree of harm caused or risked. In
cases of extreme physical injury, serious harm is immediately obvious through
the observation (sometimes by a medical expert) of welts, bruises, or bleeding.
In other cases, harm must be inferred on the basis of medical and scientific
knowledge of the likely effects of a particular kind of assault. This knowledge,
and the corresponding legal judgment of whether an assault constitutes physical
abuse, has evolved over time. Decisionmakers, perhaps especially CPS
professionals, have increasingly defined serious harm to include delayed
internal injuries, long-term disability, and even psychological or emotional
disorders. And they have increasingly relied on scientific research to conclude
whether a particular parent’s behavior is likely to cause “serious harm” to the

154. See id. (focusing exclusively on physical evidence and implicitly excluding as irrelevant to the
determination whether reasonable corporal punishment or abuse had occurred, evidence concerning
the chronicity of the corporal punishment, and the children’s related fear of returning home to their
father); supra notes 111–114 and accompanying text (describing one CPS agency’s experience with the
courts’ disinterest in emotional and developmental evidence, notwithstanding the relevance of this
evidence to its own determinations).
155. Lederman, supra note 113, at 173 and passim.
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victim, as well as whether a child’s symptoms are likely to have been caused by
parent’s abusive behavior or by some other source, such as an accidental fall.156
Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS), also known as abusive head trauma and the
leading cause of abuse-related deaths in the United States each year, provides a
model for the way scientific evidence has been used effectively by CPS and in
the legal system.157 Frustrated parents of crying babies under the age of twelve
months sometimes shake the baby back and forth or up and down in an effort to
stop the crying. This behavior can indeed place the infant into a trancelike state.
Although no adverse effect on the infant may be apparent immediately, recent
medical research has shown that the long-term consequences can be devastating
due to an infant’s unique and fragile anatomy.158 Infants are born with weak
neck muscles that cannot hold up a large head, which is prone to jostle back and
forth uncontrollably while being shaken. Infants’ brains are soft and malleable,
like unset gelatin, in contrast with adults’ brains, which are more like set gelatin.
Rapid back-and-forth head movement from shaking can rupture blood vessels
and nerves throughout the brain, tearing and destroying brain tissue. Although
immediate symptoms may be minimal, over weeks the infant may develop
irritability, lethargy, tremors, vomiting, retinal detachment, and seizures, and in
some situations, may even lapse into a coma or die. Babies who survive the
experience with none of these consequences may still suffer cerebral palsy or
mental retardation, effects that may not become evident until after age six.159
One influential study determined that seventy-two percent of known victims
suffer permanent neuro-developmental abnormalities or death.160
The anatomy and long-term consequences of internal head injury due to
shaking have been discovered only over the past twenty-five years. Because
there is no blunt injury, SBS is difficult to detect, so the phenomenon has been
doubted.161 Medical reports as recent as 1987 claimed that shaking could not be

156. See D. L. Chadwick et al., Annual Risk of Death Resulting From Short Falls Among Young
Children: Less Than 1 in 1 Million, 121 PEDIATRICS 1213 (2008).
157. See id. (focusing exclusively on physical evidence and implicitly excluding as irrelevant to the
determination whether reasonable corporal punishment or abuse had occurred, evidence concerning
the chronicity of the corporal punishment, and the children’s related fear of returning home to their
father); supra notes 111–122 and accompanying text (describing one CPS agency’s experience with the
courts’ disinterest in emotional and developmental evidence, notwithstanding the relevance of this
evidence to its own determinations).
158. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect, Shaken Baby
Syndrome: Rotational Cranial Injuries Technical Report, 108 PEDIATRICS 206, 208 (2001).
159. H. T. Keenan, et al., A Population-Based Comparison of Clinical and Outcome Characteristics
of Young Children With Serious Inflicted and Noninflicted Traumatic Brain Injury, 114 PEDIATRICS
633, 638 (2004); J. Punt et al., The ‘Unified Hypothesis’ of Geddes et al. is Not Supported by the Data, 7
PEDIATRIC REHABILITATION 173, 173 (specifically addressing cerebral palsy as a delayed outcome).
160. K. M. Barlow, E. Thomas, & R. A. Minns, Neurological and Neuropsychological Outcome of
Non-Accidental Head Injury, 3 EUR. J. OF PAEDIATRIC NEUROLOGY A139 (1999) (Abstract).
161. Mark Donohoe, The Evidence Base for Shaken Baby Syndrome: Meaning of Signature Must be
Made Explicit, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 741, 741 (2004).
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the cause of permanent injury.162 But these reports later proved inaccurate
because they were based on experiments with primates, who have stronger neck
muscles than infants.163 More-recent research using experiments on pig brains (a
more scientifically accurate comparison), infant autopsies, and longitudinal
follow-up of known cases have combined to validate the syndrome.164
SBS is now well-accepted by courts as a medical diagnosis,165 and shaking a
baby is increasingly litigated as physical abuse in the juvenile and criminal
courts.166 The history of SBS is important for corporal-punishment cases
generally because it establishes the role of scientific evidence in the
identification of parental behavior (sometimes even normative parental
behavior) as abuse. “Serious harm,” which is the criterion for abuse in most
jurisdictions, includes not only immediately obvious physical injury but also
internal brain damage and long-term psychological and cognitive disability.
Because legal cases cannot wait for an ultimate outcome, which might not be
apparent for years, published scientific research suffices as evidence that a
particular parental behavior is abusive.
Scientific evidence on the consequences of other forms of corporal
punishment has also accumulated over the past twenty-five years.167 This
evidence has contributed to an understanding that even apparently moderate
forms of corporal punishment like SBS—moderate in the sense that a severe
physical injury is not apparent to the average layperson—can have harmful
effects that merit intervention, and to a more-comprehensive sense of the
consequences of severe corporal punishment.168 These effects are stronger if the
child is young, if the parent–child relationship lacks a grounding in warmth, and
if the corporal punishment is repeated across time. Rather than discovering a
162. A. Duhaime, et al., The Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Clinical, Pathological, and Biomechanical
Study, 66 J. NEUROSURGERY 409, 414 (1987).
163. Mary E. Case, Abusive Head Injury in Infants and Young Children, 9 LEGAL MED. 83 (2007).
164. Keenan et al; supra note 159 at 636; R.A. Minns, ‘Shaken Baby Syndrome:’ Theoretical and
Evidential Controversies, 35 J. ROYAL C. PHYSICIANS EDINBURGH 5, 8–10 (2005).
165. E.g., State v. McClary, 541 A.2d 96, 102 (Conn. 1988) (holding that SBS is a well accepted
medical diagnosis); State v. Lopez, 412 S.E.2d 390, 393 (S.C. 1991).
166. Brian. K. Holmgren, Assistant District Attorney General, Davidson County, Tennessee,
Irresponsible
Expert
Testimony,
http://www.dontshake.org/sbs.php?topNavID=3&subNavID
=28&navID=115 (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
167. This literature distinguishes the experience of physical abuse from the experience of corporal
punishment, although corporal punishment is usually graded on a continuum of severity and chronicity
that ends in abuse. Indeed, eleven states (Florida, Illinois, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, West Virginia) and the District of Columbia
declare that “excessive corporal punishment” constitutes child maltreatment, and an additional eleven
states declare that corporal punishment is maltreatment if it is “cruel” (Connecticut, Colorado,
Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, South Dakota), “unlawful” (California), “excessive or unreasonable”
(Wyoming), “severe” (New Jersey), “cruel and inhuman” (Kansas), or “ extreme” (Maine). Howard
Davidson, The Legal Aspects of Corporal Punishment in the Home: When Does Physical Discipline
Cross the Line to Become Child Abuse?, 17 CHILD. LEGAL RIGHTS J., 18, 20, 23–25 (1997).
168. L. J. Berlin et al., Correlates and Consequences of Spanking and Verbal Punishment for LowIncome White, African-American, and Mexican-American Toddlers, 80 CHILD DEV. 1403, 1411–12
(2009).
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cut-off level below which corporal punishment has no ill effects, scientists
interpret the research findings as indicating that corporal punishment
experiences have a cumulative effect that grows proportionately with the
amount and severity of punishment. Furthermore, the relation between
corporal punishment and poor child outcomes is an empirical one, meaning that
not every case of corporal punishment is followed by child maladjustment.
A review of eighty-eight empirical studies involving 36,309 children has
shown that children who have been subjected to moderate corporal punishment
display, on average, more-immediate compliance with parental directives but
also higher levels of aggressive, delinquent, and antisocial behavior than do
children who have not been corporally punished.169 The causal direction of this
association has been called into question170 because antisocial children might
well elicit more corporal punishment or because the same genes that make
parents use aggression toward their children may be responsible for their child’s
aggression, apart from any causal link between the parenting and the child’s
behavior.171 Indeed, when common genes are controlled, the causal impact of
corporal punishment on the child’s aggression is lessened but still present.172
Other longitudinal studies have followed corporally punished and
noncorporally punished children over years to examine growth in antisocial
behavior and the onset of new outcomes due to corporal punishment. With
these empirical controls in place, the impact of corporal punishment on
American children can now be estimated with greater confidence. Two recent,
rigorously conducted studies illuminate the picture. One study, which followed
3,001 white, African American, and Mexican low-income toddlers from ages
one to three, found that, even after controlling for fussiness or other factors that
might lead a parent to spank a young child, the experience of being spanked
even modestly caused children to become more aggressive and to have lower
cognitive development (as measured by the well-validated Bayley Scales of
Infant Development).173 A second study followed two cohorts of children: the
first, a group of 499 children followed from ages five to sixteen; the second, a
group of 258 children followed from ages five to fifteen. This study found that in
both cohorts, chronic mild spanking in children from ages five to nine led to
increased antisocial behavior problems in adolescence. 174 It must be noted that

169. Elizabeth Thompson Gershoff, Corporal Punishment by Parents and Associated Child
Behaviors and Experiences: A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review, 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 539, 541
(2002).
170. Diana Baumrind, Robert. E. Larzelere & Philip A. Cowan, Ordinary Physical Punishment: Is it
Harmful? Comment on Gershoff (2002), 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 580, 585 (2002).
171. Sara R. Jaffee et al., The Limits of Child Effects: Evidence for Genetically Mediated Child
Effects on Corporal Punishment but Not on Physical Maltreatment, 40 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.
1047, 1053 (2004).
172. Id. at 1053–56.
173. Berlin et al., supra note 168, at 1412.
174. Jennifer E. Lansford et al., Trajectories of Physical Discipline: Early Childhood Antecedents
and Developmental Outcomes, 80 CHILD DEV. 1385, 1397–1401 (2009).
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the children who suffered these outcomes were regularly spanked mildly over a
long period of time, which was not the case in other studies where the child
subjects experienced mild spanking very infrequently.175 The best scientific
evidence thus indicates that the impact of regular mild spanking on a child aged
one to nine appears, on average, to be significantly adverse but modest in
magnitude.176 In general, children who have been regularly, mildly corporally
punished by parents are likely to become less cognitively skilled and more
aggressive over time and to use aggression in solving future problems, including
in raising their children; rarely, however, do they become criminally violent as a
result of mild corporal punishment alone.177
Nuances complicate this picture, however: First, mild corporal punishments
do not have a uniform impact on child outcomes across all contexts and
circumstances. The parent’s behavior per se is less significant than the meaning
of the behavior as interpreted by the child.178 This meaning is determined by the
family context, including chronicity of the act, the contingency of the act on the
child’s misbehavior, mitigating factors such as temporary stress and the child’s
instigation of the act, and exacerbating factors such as parents’ taunting and
psychological abuse. Thus, empirical studies demonstrate that corporal
punishment can be helpful, unimportant, or harmful to the child’s development,
depending on the meaning ascribed by the child. A limit on this conclusion is
that, beyond a certain level of severity of corporal punishment, harmful
outcomes are likely to accrue to the child no matter what context surrounds the
act or how it is interpreted by the child.179 This level is not always clear but may
be a defining characteristic of physical abuse.
Second, not all corporal punishments are administered in the same way, and
the different ways have different impacts. Although it would be simpler if
detrimental corporal-punishment behaviors could be defined by specific
behaviors, research studies indicate that the behavior itself is less prognostic
than the behavior in its context. Multiple studies have shown that when
corporal punishment is administered calmly for teaching purposes within a
family context of parent–child warmth, its negative consequences for the child
are minimal; in contrast, when administered in anger, impulsively, or out of
control, corporal punishment is more likely to lead to adverse consequences in

175. Straus & Stewart, supra note 149, at 64–66.
176. Kirby Deater-Deckard et al., Physical Discipline among African American and European
American Mothers: Links to Children’s Externalizing Behaviors, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1065,
1069–70 (1996).
177. As explained infra note 180 and in the accompanying text, these outcomes (that is, lowered
cognitive skills, increased aggressive behavior, and increased use of aggression when parenting) for the
corporally punished child qualify as functional impairments according to established medical practice.
178. Deater-Deckard et al., supra note 176, at 1069–70.
179. Id. at 1070.
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the child, including increased anxiety and aggressive behavior.180 When corporal
punishment is administered capriciously, inconsistently, and with accompanying
verbal and psychological abuse, its impact is more harmful. One reason for
these differences is that the child is likely to interpret the parent’s actions
differently in these various contexts. When mild corporal punishment is
administered calmly for teaching purposes, the child is likely to understand the
parent’s positive intent, whereas when it is administered harshly, inconsistently,
and angrily, the child is more likely to interpret the act as rejection and to react
with anxiety and increased deviant behavior over time.181
Third, cross-cultural studies across the world have shown that the cultural
normativeness of corporal punishment alters the impact that it has on a child.182
If a corporal-punishment behavior is relatively common in a culture (such as
mild spanking with a bare hand one to three times across the buttocks, as in the
United States), then the child is more likely to understand its teaching value
and is less likely to develop adverse reactions than if the corporal-punishment
behavior is highly unusual (such as placing hot pepper on a child’s tongue,
which is unusual in the United States but more common in other cultures).
Studies have revealed that spanking has less-deleterious effects in Kenya and
India, where it is ubiquitous, than in China and Thailand, where it is relatively
rare.183 Ironically, as corporal punishment becomes less common in American
society, parents who continue to engage in this practice may find that it begins
to have stronger adverse effects on their children.184
In contrast with the nuanced and paradoxical effects of mild corporal
punishment, corporal punishment that is cruel or severe has been found in
multiple studies to have deleterious consequences. These consequences are
diversely manifested and vary across children but can be summarized as
disability, or “functional impairment,” a term adapted from medical sciences.185
In psychiatry, a symptom such as alcohol consumption, sadness, or repetitive
odd behavior is not diagnostic of a disorder unless it is accompanied by
180. Kenneth Dodge, V. C. McLoyd & Jennifer E. Lansford, The Cultural Context of Physically
Disciplining Children, in EMERGING ISSUES IN AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE: CONTEXT,
ADAPTATION, AND POLICY 245 (V.C. McLoyd, N.E. Hill & Kenneth Dodge eds., 2005).
181. Id. The moderating factors that affect the impact of parental corporal punishment on a child’s
outcome are very similar to the factors that judges use to decide whether a parental behavior is abusive.
Judges may already intuitively understand the factors that determine the harmfulness of a behavior,
although the systematic use of scientific evidence would ensure more uniform application of this
knowledge.
182. Jennifer E. Lansford et al., Physical Discipline and Children’s Adjustment: Cultural
Normativeness as a Moderator, 76 CHILD DEVEL. 1234, 1244 (2005).
183. Id.
184. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (describing this trend). Lest one conclude that if
severe corporal punishment were to become ubiquitous its adverse impact would be nil, cross-cultural
studies have shown that there is a residual effect of a cultural norm that endorses such punishment of
children: such societies are likely to have higher rates of adult violence and even war. Jennifer E.
Lansford & Kenneth Dodge, Cultural Norms for Adult Corporal Punishment of Children and Societal
Rates of Endorsement and Use of Violence, 8 PARENTING: SCI. & PRACTICE 257, 266–67 (2008).
185. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (defining functional impairment).
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impairment in completing the tasks of daily life, such as holding down a job and
maintaining relationships. Applied to corporal punishment, if the consequences
for the child include functional impairment, then the parental actions are
serious enough to be characterized as physical abuse.
Long-term follow-ups of children found by CPS to have been maltreated
indicate that they are likely to suffer a variety of functional impairments,
including an increased tendency to commit violent crime, to abuse alcohol and
drugs, to acquire sexually transmitted diseases, to suffer from depression, and to
victimize their own children.186 Although these studies bring the certainty that
comes with identifying and following children whose physical abuse has been
officially substantiated, they are complicated by the problem that the
interventions accompanying official substantiation (such as removal from the
home and labeling the child as abused) might be the actual adverse causal agent
rather than the abuse per se.
Another group of studies has followed community samples of children who
were identified by researchers as having been severely corporally punished; the
identification in these studies was made based on confidential interviews with
the children’s parents.187 Their design contrasts children who have experienced
severe corporal punishment with those who have experienced either no
corporal punishment or only mild corporal punishment. Like the long-term
follow-ups of children found by CPS to have been maltreated, these studies also
reveal that physically maltreated children are likely to suffer numerous adverse
outcomes, including being arrested for violent as well as nonviolent offenses,
dropping out of school, becoming a teenage parent, and being fired from
employment.188 These outcomes hold across cultural groups and family contexts,
suggesting a fairly universal adverse impact of the experience of physical
abuse.189
In sum, scientific findings have established that the experience of corporal
punishment has consequences for the child. For mild and normative levels of
corporal punishment, these consequences may include, on the positive end,
immediate compliance with parental commands and, on the negative end,
increased anxiety, aggressive behavior, decreased academic success, and lower
self-esteem.190 The cost–benefit ratio of these consequences seems adverse to
some observers but acceptable to others. In this society and according to the
law, the decision about the acceptability of this parental behavior rests with the
parent under the principle of parental autonomy to the extent that the
186. Ruth Gilbert et al., Child Maltreatment: Burden and Consequences in High-Income Countries,
373 LANCET 68, 76–77 (2009).
187. Kenneth A. Dodge, J.E. Bates & G.S. Pettit, Mechanisms in the Cycle of Violence, 250 SCI.
1678, 1678 (1990); Jennifer E. Lansford et al., Early Physical Abuse and Later Violent Delinquency: A
Prospective Longitudinal Study, 12 CHILD MALTREATMENT 233, 233 (2007).
188. Id. at 238.
189. Id. at 240.
190. Gershoff, supra note 169, at 549–50; Chih (Peter) L. Chen, Is There a Right Way to Discipline a
Child, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 105, 106–07 (2007).
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consequences, on average, do not exceed the threshold that would lead to
functional impairment. Depending on the severity, chronicity, or context of
corporal punishment, however, parental behavior can also harm the child,
including to the level of functional impairment, and that thus should be
identified as physical abuse.
Except in obvious and very extreme cases, developmental science cannot
guide the identification of specific parental behaviors that will lead inevitably to
the child’s functional impairment. It cannot be concluded, for example, that six
swats to the buttocks will lead to impairment but four will not, or that one swat
to a two-year-old will lead to impairment but several swats to a seven-year-old
will not. The problem is not only that prediction is probabilistic; but a confident
prediction comes also from understanding the meaning of the behaviors rather
than the behaviors themselves.191 Here, developmental science can be
informative. Corporal punishment is likely to lead to functional impairment to
the extent that the child (even a toddler or infant) experiences and interprets
the parent’s actions as rejecting, hateful, or threatening.
Guidelines for the decisionmaker come from features of both the parent’s
behavior and the child’s reaction. Parents’ corporal-punishment behaviors are
relatively likely to lead to the child’s functional impairment if the punishment is
committed in the heat of anger or out of control (such as alcohol-induced
behavior); if it communicates rejection of the child (as when accompanied by
hateful words); if it is intentionally cruel, not embedded in a broader
relationship of trust and security between parent and child, or if not obviously
intended to help the child learn a specific lesson; if it indicates no understanding
of the child’s ability to receive the message of the behavior; or if it is not
preceded by the child’s misbehavior.
On the child’s end, parental corporal-punishment behaviors are relatively
likely to lead to functional impairment if the child experiences fundamental
attachment insecurity (indicated by overdependence, avoidance, or dissociative
behaviors), if the child indicates a strong fear of being alone with the parent, or
if the child communicates feeling hated or rejected by the parent. Although
being fearful of corporal punishment itself is not sufficient to constitute a
functional impairment, a resulting disruption of the child’s secure attachment to
a parent is. Of course, children sometimes lie or fail to communicate clearly,
and so clinical judgment by a skilled professional may be particularly helpful to
this process.
In the end, the decision whether a parent’s behavior constitutes physical
abuse may be best construed as a judgment by a scientifically informed expert.
This judgment is not arbitrary, however, and can be made based on the meaning

191. See Kenneth Dodge, John D. Coie & Donald Lynam, Aggression and Antisocial Behavior in
Youth, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL, EMOTIONAL, AND PERSONALITY
DEVELOPMENT 719 (Nancy Eisenberg ed., 6th ed. 2006); see generally Kenneth Dodge, Translational
Science in Action: Hostile Attributional Style and the Development of Aggressive Behavior Problems, 18
DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 791 (2006).
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that the behavior communicates to the child and the meaning that the child
makes of the pattern.
IV.
RECONCILING NORMS AND KNOWLEDGE AND PROPOSALS FOR POLICY
REFORM
This article began with the premise that modern child-abuse definitions have
three negative effects that require periodic reconsideration: (1) The definitions
fail to fulfill the expressive or signaling function of the law; that is, they fail to
give meaningful guidance to the relevant legal actors. (2) The definitions yield
inconsistent case outcomes. And (3) they risk unacceptable errors, including
both false-positive and false-negative findings of maltreatment. Part II
elaborated on these points, describing what is known about where and how
legislatures, CPS, and the courts draw the line between reasonable and unlawful
corporal punishment. Part III described the normative and scientific
assumptions that sometimes operate in tandem and sometimes compete for
primacy as this line is drawn, in particular by the courts and CPS. This last part
begins with an argument for reforms to ameliorate the negative effects of
modern child-abuse definitions that reflect both parental-autonomy norms and
scientific knowledge, and follows with specific suggestions for policy reform.
A. An Argument for an Intentional Reconciliation of Norms and Knowledge
Law governing where and how to draw the line between reasonable
corporal punishment and abuse ought to reflect a reconciliation of parentalautonomy norms and scientific evidence about the circumstances that cause
children real harm. These two paradigms together should govern the
development of the operative legal definitions and process because, separately
and at times in combination, they are the approaches currently used by the
relevant legal actors. In contemporary American society, which values both
parental autonomy and healthy child development, it makes good policy sense
to respect parents’ decisions about disciplining their children and to permit
intervention in the family only when children are harmed or in jeopardy of
harm. Moreover, intervention in the family itself causes or risks harm to
children and families and thus ought to be avoided unless supported by reliable
indicia that intervention will do more good than harm.192
Reconciling these paradigms should not be ad hoc or based on intuition or
presumed knowledge. Rather, it ought to be intentional: parental-autonomy
norms should take primacy when they are firmly entrenched in legal theory and
doctrine. Conversely, they should yield when they are not so entrenched and
when relevant and reliable scientific evidence indicates that deference will cause
real harm to children. Relevant and reliable scientific evidence should take
192. See Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3, at notes 7–10 and 308–17 and accompanying
text.
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primacy over personal opinions, whatever their basis. And such evidence should
otherwise be treated consistently with evidence law generally, as being both
admissible and useful to the evaluation of individual cases. Our proposal for
policy reform is thus based on the framework of parental autonomy and calls
for scientific evidence to be introduced within this framework.
Consistent with this intentional reconciliation of evidence and norms, we
propose that the line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse be
drawn at the point—which we acknowledge will be blurry at times—where valid
evidence, based in the scientific literature or current case circumstances,
indicates that parental conduct has caused or risks causing functional
impairment.193 With this criterion, we reject concern for parental behavior that
would prevent an average-functioning child from achieving a higher level; we
concern ourselves only with parental behavior that causes or risks disability or
impairment. This standard—as opposed to a weaker or stronger one—is
appropriate because it best balances the society’s respect for parental autonomy
and science’s findings about when children are actually harmed by corporal
punishment. Specifically, it is consistent with long-standing parental autonomy
and corporal-punishment law, which draw the line of impermissibility at assaults
that are either not in the child’s best interests or that will accomplish the
opposite of the goal of the corporal-punishment exception—securing the child’s
future as a law-abiding and otherwise successful child and citizen.194 Notably, the
rationales underlying the traditional corporal-punishment exception focus on
the child’s intellectual and emotional development, not on the child’s physical
well-being. Indeed, these rationales assume that physical punishment can
positively affect intellectual and emotional development. In evaluating the
reasonableness of corporal punishment, many decisionmakers prefer to focus
exclusively on the immediate physical impacts of corporal punishment and to
ignore or minimize emotional and developmental ones. Doing so, however, is
antithetical to the purposes of the exception. The functional-impairment
standard is also consistent with CPS’s role in the line-drawing process, which—
the views of some professionals to the contrary—is to balance the harm that
parents are or may be causing their children against the harm risked by

193. Functional impairment refers to short- or long-term or permanent impairment of emotional or
physical functioning in tasks of daily living. See supra III.B.
194. For example, corporal punishment that causes a child to fail academically, to have disciplinary
problems in school, to be fearful of personal relationships, or to become a violent adult, achieves
precisely the opposite of the result intended by the corporal punishment exception—that is, a lawabiding and otherwise successful adult. The standard that defines unlawful corporal punishment must
provide the relevant legal actors with the basis to classify such punishment as abuse. It should not,
however, permit classification as abuse of incidents and injuries that do not cause such impairments.
There are no perfect parents, and everyone can imagine themselves to be damaged even by exceptional
ones. Routine childhood injuries, whether these are physical or emotional, are not what maltreatment
law was or ought to be designed to address.
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intervention, and to penetrate the boundaries of family privacy only when there
is good reason to believe that the former is more weighty than the latter.195
B. Suggestions for Policy Reform
Consistent with this argument, policy reforms that can ameliorate the three
negative effects targeted by this article—the failure of existing law to satisfy its
expressive function, inconsistent outcomes, and a risk of false-positive and
false-negative findings of maltreatment—include changes to the structure of
some child-abuse statutes and clarification of their included terms. Some of the
following recommendations reflect existing best practices in statutory language
and court or CPS practice. Others reflect a rejection of existing practices or the
development of alternatives that better conform to the premises underlying the
corporal-punishment exception and the scientific evidence that supports the
resolution of individual cases. The model corporal-punishment provision
concluding this section demonstrates how the recommendations can work
together to provide the relevant legal actors with a systematic approach to
drawing the line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse that
reconciles parental-autonomy norms and scientific evidence.
1. Structure
Corporal-punishment exceptions to child-abuse provisions should be made
to track the common-law privilege; that is, the exception should be available for
discipline only, and then only for force that is reasonable.196 The two-pronged
standard makes better policy sense than approaches that focus or appear to
focus only on the reasonableness of the force used because it is the most
accurate and thus most helpful statement of the applicable law, and because it
emphasizes (or brings into the equation) the oft-forgotten threshold condition
for the privilege: that it is ultimately in the child’s interest that the force be
used.197 Conversely, this standard makes clear that the privilege does not apply
in circumstances that are not in the child’s interests, for example, when a parent

195. Many CPS professionals are not aware of or else reject this balancing test. See, e.g., interview
by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS frontline investigator,
Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP) (explaining that CPS’s job is to protect
children, not to safeguard parents’ rights). They may believe that respect for family privacy and
parental autonomy only hurt children, or at least those children they are assigned to investigate. See
Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3, at 415–16. In fact, however, the overriding presumption in
American law is that parents act in the best interests of their children until proven otherwise. Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). This means that CPS interventions conducted in advance of such proof
disrupt parents’ efforts to do right by their children. CPS interventions thus are risking harm even as
they are designed to protect against it. To the extent that this legal presumption and its logical
ramifications reflect how society in general views the relationship between CPS and families, CPS
professionals who ignore the balancing test are (at least) operating against that grain. Coleman,
Storming the Castle, supra note 3, at 531–38.
196. See supra notes 129–135 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 129–135 and accompanying text.
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lashes out maliciously or without motive or reason.198 In other words, when the
discipline condition is not met, the parent has committed abuse and, in the civil
or criminal context, an unprivileged assault or battery. Notably, the merits of
this traditional doctrine are reinforced by scientific findings that children are
more likely to suffer functional impairments from moderate corporal
punishment when they do not perceive a legitimate disciplinary motive.199
2. Burden of Proof
The state should have the burden of alleging and proving that a parent has
abused a child. Parents suspected of child abuse who believe that their conduct
is appropriately protected by the corporal-punishment exception are
responsible for raising this claim and for producing some supporting evidence,
including specific evidence tending to show that discipline was appropriate and
that the force used was reasonable in the circumstances. When a parent does so,
the state has the specific burden of disproving the parent’s claim.
Placing the ultimate burden on the state is appropriate for three reasons.
First, regardless of whether the common-law right to use reasonable corporal
punishment as a means of discipline is also a constitutional one, it is
undoubtedly true that society places a premium on parental autonomy and
family privacy, and that the strong expectation of the citizenry is these rights
will not be violated by the state without a very good reason. Additionally, and
again regardless of the constitutional status of the right to use corporal
punishment, most child-maltreatment investigations implicate constitutional
limits on state searches and seizures, including the requirement that the state
establish a likelihood of maltreatment before it intervenes.200 Second, most CPS
investigations result in a finding of no maltreatment. At the same time, the
investigations cause or risk causing at least some emotional harm to the child
and family.201 Incentivizing the state’s consideration of these concerns before it
intervenes in the family should help to reduce the harm caused or risked by

198. Older statutory language often made this caveat express, and similar language has found its
way into some judicial decisions. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 487 A.2d 294, 298 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985) (“So taken for granted that it tends to be neglected by the case law and legal literature, is that the
force truly be used in the exercise of domestic authority by way of punishing or disciplining the child—
for the betterment of the child or promotion of the child’s welfare—and not be a gratuitous attack.”);
see also, e.g., Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d 341, 348 (Md. App. Ct. 1978) (“On the other hand, where
corporal punishment was inflicted with ‘a malicious desire to cause pain’ or where it amounted to ‘cruel
and outrageous’ treatment of the child, the chastisement was deemed unreasonable, thus defeating the
parental privilege and subjecting the parent to penal sanctions in those circumstances where criminal
liability would have existed absent the parent-child relationship.”).
199. Kirby Deater-Deckard, Kenneth Dodge & Emma Sorbring, Cultural Differences in the Effects
of Physical Punishment, in ETHNICITY AND CAUSAL MECHANISMS 204, 211 (Michael Rutter & Marta
Tienda eds., 2005).
200. See Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3, at 471–76 (discussing the courts’ insistence that
CPS investigations are subject to the Fourth Amendment, their disagreement about the standard that
applies in that context, the reasonable suspicion administrative search standard or the probable cause
standard, and the apparent preference for the probable cause standard).
201. See id. at 417–19, 511–22.
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unnecessary interventions. Third, as a practical matter, most parents do not
have the knowledge or resources necessary to prove the standard proposed
below, particularly the second prong: that the corporal punishment at issue does
not cause functional impairment. The state, on the other hand, could more
easily marshal this evidence given its expertise; furthermore, the evidence
would mostly be reusable in its other and future cases.
Formalizing the requirement that parents raise the corporal-punishment
exception and provide some supporting evidence as to both prongs of the
standard is appropriate within this context because parents would be reminded
that the right to use corporal punishment is a special privilege, an exception to
the usual rule that assault and battery are impermissible. This requirement, in
turn, is good for children and families because it forces parents to consider ex
ante their decision and whether it conforms with the norms of the community or
legal rules otherwise. Such ex ante examination—coupled with the choice to
conform to community norms and legal rules—can reduce the number of cases
brought to CPS’s attention, thus obviating potentially damaging intervention in
the family. It can also reduce the incidence of functional impairment to
children, since impairment is unlikely when punishment is normative and
consciously considered by parents for the express purpose of teaching the child
in a context of a warm parent–child relationship.202 It is particularly important
for parents and other legal actors to know, in advance of their actions, that the
scope of the privilege to use corporal punishment is not self-defined; rather,
precisely because it is a privilege based in common-law doctrine that itself refers
to community norms, those norms will influence when others choose to report,
when CPS chooses to intervene, and, if the courts do get involved, how they
resolve the case.203
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the inevitable tension between laws
that are based in community norms and the nonconforming practices of
minority members of the community. In the context of this article, the law
currently permits “reasonable” corporal punishment, reasonableness
traditionally being defined according to community norms.204 This law is and has
always been problematic for those in the community whose norms diverge, for
example, because of differing religious or cultural beliefs. The difficulty will
likely be exacerbated in the future, as community norms about the
reasonableness of corporal punishment evolve increasingly to restrict its
permutations and use.205 Our proposal to make functional impairment the basis
for line-drawing between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse should
ameliorate this problem. That is, although the normativeness of corporal
punishment would continue to play a significant role in the analysis, the weight
202. See supra notes 180–184 and 190–191 and accompanying text.
203. Even if the right were based in the Federal Constitution, however, community norms would
likely continue to govern its scope. See supra notes 129–135 and 142–149 and accompanying text.
204. See infra note 207 (describing how reasonableness as a standard is developed in law).
205. See supra notes 142–149 and accompanying text (describing this evolution).
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associated with this factor would be systematically checked by evidence of
actual harm to the child. Thus, for example, the state would be unable to prove
abuse if it could not prove functional impairment. The state’s assumptions
about the unusual being bad would, in such a case, be proven incorrect. Of
course, regardless of the normativeness of the practice, abuse would be found
on evidence of functional impairment. 206
3. Explanation of the Discipline Requirement
The first prong of our proposed two-pronged corporal-punishment rule
requires an evaluation of the propriety of discipline in the circumstances. The
propriety of discipline should be judged objectively; that is, the decision that the
circumstances preceding the use of force required discipline must have been a
reasonable one. We contemplate that reasonableness in these circumstances is,
as it always is in the law, either a factual finding about the acceptability of the
decision according to community norms, or, in the alternative, a legal ruling
about what the community’s norms ought to be.207 In doing so, we reject a
different approach that would defer to parents on this question, because such
deference is ultimately a statement that a disciplinary purpose is not really a
condition of the exception.
In the vast majority of cases, the parent’s decision that discipline (or some
form of parental intervention) is warranted will be acceptable to the court, so
the discipline prong will not often be contested. The court will likely accept the
parent’s decision because most parents who use corporal punishment are not
malicious, uncaring, or acting in complicated developmental circumstances, and
because most cases that come to the attention of the authorities involve a child
who has transgressed in some way that the community would agree warrants
discipline. The only question in these cases, then, is whether the force used was
reasonable.
206. See supra notes 182–184 and accompanying text (discussing the scientific evidence concerning
the link between normativeness and functional impairment) and infra notes 215–223 and accompanying
text (describing the role that normativeness plays in our proposals for reform).
207. Reasonableness in law is thus either consistent with existing community norms or else
aspirational. In the former, more typical case, the determination whether something is reasonable is
made by the trier of fact, usually the jury. When a norm has been established by the jury over a series of
cases, judges may decline in future similar cases to submit the question to another jury on the ground
that the matter has been amply settled. In the latter, more-atypical case, the determination whether
something is reasonable is taken away from the jury by the judge on the ground that community norms
are ultimately unacceptable. See, e.g., Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355 (Del. 1995) (deciding the
question whether AIDS phobia was reasonable “as a matter of law,” thus removing it from the jury’s
consideration, on the basis that the state should not be in the business of sanctioning such phobia no
matter how normative). In suggesting that judges ought to continue to be permitted to decide what a
community’s norms ought to be—as prevailing reasonableness analysis does—we do not propose that
they be given the leeway to codify their personal opinions; indeed, we specifically reject this as
unreasonable. Rather, we propose that they be authorized to prohibit even normative forms of corporal
punishment when these are scientifically proven to cause functional impairment. The example we have
already used of such a case is SBS, which is still normative in some situations but which, based on
scientific evidence, ought to be prohibited always. See supra notes 158–166 and 209–210 and
accompanying text (discussing SBS in this context).
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Formally establishing the requirement that discipline be warranted remains
essential, however, to addressing those infrequent instances when parents do
act out of malice or a lack of caring, as well as those circumstances in which a
child or category of children cannot benefit from and may even be significantly
harmed by the disciplinary effort. Examples of the latter include infants and
some special-needs children who, because of their level of brain development or
pathology, simply cannot make the connection between their conduct and the
physical force that follows. This inability to understand cause and effect is
significant because children may become functionally impaired as a result of
even moderate levels of corporal punishment that they cannot understand as
being for their own good.208 Perhaps the most well-known example of the use of
science in this context is SBS.209 Without a formal construct in which to argue
that discipline is appropriate (reasonable or unreasonable) in the circumstances,
the relevance of such evidence may not be apparent to the maltreatment
inquiry.
Several states have chosen to codify the common-law standard as we
suggest, as a two-pronged test requiring that accused parents establish both a
disciplinary motive and the reasonableness of the force used.210 As to the first,
disciplinary prong, some states require a finding that discipline be reasonable in
the circumstances, whereas others require a finding of necessity.211 The necessity
standard places a much higher burden on parents: it is literally the difference
between having to establish that the community would or should find a
particular discipline acceptable and that the community would or should find
such discipline necessary.
For the following reasons, we strongly suggest adoption of the
reasonableness standard. First, the need for discipline in many instances is a
judgment call whose merits cannot be established with precision, perhaps
particularly by outsiders to the family. Unlike the necessity standard, the
reasonableness standard permits the fact-finder to defer to parents’ judgment so
long as it is within the range of acceptable decisions. Second, society continues
to support parents’ right to use corporal punishment, ensuring that normative
discipline—discipline that meets the reasonableness standard—generally will
not cause functional impairment. Third, the necessity standard risks
unnecessary and potentially harmful interventions in the family, an effect that
designers of maltreatment law ought to avoid whenever possible.

208. See supra notes 102, 115–120 and accompanying text.
209. For a description of SBS and its effects, see supra notes 158–166 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
211. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-503(2)(C)(1) (“‘Abuse’ shall not include physical discipline
of a child when it is reasonable and moderate and is inflicted by a parent or guardian for purposes of
restraining or correcting the child.”), with In re T.A., 663 N.W.2d 225, 230 (S.D. 2003) (considering
whether a parent’s discipline of his child was “rendered necessary” by the child’s actions).
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4. Explanation of the Requirement that the Force Used Be Reasonable
The second prong of our proposed two-pronged corporal punishment
requires an evaluation of the reasonableness of the force used. If the state can
prove that the use of force in the circumstances was unreasonable, it has
established that child abuse occurred. The basis for evaluating this second
prong ought to be whether what the parent has done has caused or risks causing
functional impairment.
Again, functional impairment refers to short-term, long-term, or permanent
impairment of emotional or physical functioning.212 Scientific evidence about
which parenting behaviors lead to functional impairment supports the formal
incorporation of several factors into this aspect of the reasonableness inquiry:
the severity of the physical injury that results from parental conduct; whether
the parent’s conduct is normative; the proportionality of the conduct in relation
to the child’s transgression; the manner in which the punishment is
administered, which includes consideration of the location of the child’s injuries
and whether any objects were used; chronicity, meaning the frequency of the
corporal punishment; and transparency and consistency, or whether the child
knows the rules that will result in punishment and whether the parent
administers those rules non-arbitrarily.213 Aside from the severity criterion, all of
the factors force examination of the context in which the corporal punishment
occurs and of the child’s reaction to that context.214 Depending upon the
circumstances, any one of these factors alone or two or more factors in
combination might suffice to characterize parental conduct as unreasonable.
For example, a one-time incident in which a parent strikes a child so hard that a
bone breaks will be severe enough on its own to cause or risk causing functional
impairment, so there would be no need to establish the existence or weight of
the remaining factors. Conversely, moderate (more than mild, less than severe)
corporal punishment will generally be insufficient on its own to cause functional
impairment; only if it is coupled with other factors—for example, a lack of
proportionality, transparency and consistency, or chronicity—can moderate
corporal punishment be predicted to cause functional impairment.
Although all of these factors play a potentially significant role in the analysis
of individual cases, the question whether the manner and degree of punishment
is normative is relevant in all cases. Nonnormative corporal punishment is more
likely than normative corporal punishment to result in functional impairment.215
Thus, if an incident of corporal punishment is normative, it is and ought to be
less likely to result in a finding of abuse, and vice versa. Of course, some
nonnormative behavior will neither cause nor risk functional impairment and
some normative behavior will cause or risk causing functional impairment.
Some religiously motivated corporal punishments may fall into the former
212.
213.
214.
215.

See supra notes 26, 28, 43–46, 61, 102, 115–119, 131–35 and accompanying text.
See supra III.B.
See supra notes 167–191 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 182–184 and accompanying text.
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category, and SBS is (again) a good example of a practice that falls into the
latter. In such cases, normativeness should not be determinative.
Normativeness is already central to how reporters, CPS, and judges decide
reasonableness; such actors are more likely to view what is unusual to or
different for them (based on community culture or personal orientation) as
abuse—indeed, in some jurisdictions, it may be the predominant criterion.216
Abnormality is also an empirical criterion, in that norms are defined by the rate
of use in a particular culture or society.217 Using empirical data as a check on
personal views or current practices can reduce the incidence of ad hoc “know it
when you see it” fact-finding, and thus standardize what is and is not considered
normative, at least within individual communities or jurisdictions.218 Entirely
apart from its usefulness to reduce ad hoc fact-finding, this particular use of
scientific evidence is important because what is normative in terms of corporal
punishment is rapidly shifting, and as a result, practitioners may not be as aware
of actual current normative practice as they believe they are. Empirical
knowledge about changes in social norms and parenting practices is becoming
more readily available and should be communicated to practitioners, lawyers,
and judges regularly.
A problem in the implementation of the normativeness criterion is that the
frequency and tolerance of corporal-punishment practices varies across
jurisdictions, cultural groups, and time. Parents employ different corporalpunishment practices across the world. Spanking with a bare hand across the
buttocks is relatively common in the United States, whereas in other cultures,
different practices are relatively common, such as beating with a stick, “coining”
a child by rolling a hot coin across the back, and forcing a child to swallow hot
peppers.219 Practices vary across jurisdictions even within the United States.
Corporal punishment itself is more common in the South than the North,
among African American families than European American families, and
among lower socioeconomic-status families than middle- and higher-status
families.220 Also, religious cultural groups may encourage or discourage specific
practices, creating the possibility that a parent will find the use of a corporalpunishment practice to be normative within a narrow religious culture even
though it is unusual in the broader society. Further, cultural norms have
changed across generations. Parents sometimes defend their corporalpunishment practices based on the family norm they experienced growing up,

216. See supra notes 1, 3, 8, and 80–88 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 1 and 182–184 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of ad hoc factfinding).
219. For a discussion of these and other “nonnormative” disciplines, see Renteln, supra note 4, at §
IV.
220. Kirby Deater-Deckard & Kenneth A. Dodge, Externalizing Behavior Problems and Discipline
Revisited: Nonlinear Effects and Variation by Culture, Context, and Gender, 8 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 161,
163 (1997) (noting the cultural and socio-economic differences). Kirby Deater-Deckard et al., supra
note 176, at 1071 (concluding about the differences between regions within the United States).
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even in the face of a contemporary societal prohibition.221 Defining a parental
practice as “reasonable” based on cultural normativeness is complicated by
these varying norms. Without specific statutory guidance, CPS and the courts
must decide which cultural norm to apply (from that of the society at large, the
individual’s actual familial or cultural frame of reference, or the norm to which
the judge aspires for the society) when determining the reasonableness of a
particular disciplinary incident.
Resolving how a legislature ought to define the reference community for the
purposes of establishing the normativeness of a particular manner or degree of
corporal punishment is beyond the scope of this article. But we encourage
serious consideration of the question, and in particular, a focus on the different
implications of a decision to base normativeness on the views of the broader
community in which the family lives or on those of the family’s particular
community—the immediate or extended family, including its affiliations,
religious and otherwise. Specifically, a decision to base normativeness on the
views of the broader community would assure that all children and families are
treated similarly under the law, an outcome consistent with equal-protection
doctrine and the antidiscrimination norms at its foundation.222 It would also
mean, however, that at least in some cases—particularly those involving
younger children who are still members only of their parents’ world—the
maltreatment finding would be based on a larger group norm that is in fact
nonnormative for the child. In other words, the law would create the fiction that
the parent’s conduct was nonnormative when, for that child, it would be
precisely the contrary. Because it is the child’s perspective on normativeness
that matters for purposes of functional impairment, application of this rule to
children in this category would be inconsistent with their welfare. In contrast,
basing the normativeness finding on the parents’ particular community would
assure that the finding is consistent with the child’s point of view—and thus a
better predictor of functional impairment—but only so long as the child is too
young to be or does not choose to be a member of the broader community and
a beneficiary of its different norms. Ultimately, we believe that defining
normativeness must depend on the political culture and practical resources of
the state or locality responsible for defining the standards by which abuse will
be judged.223
Finally, although lists of illustrative violations in statutory definitions and
CPS protocols may help to reduce parents’ and reporters’ concerns about the

221. See, e.g., supra note 88.
222. See generally Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism:
The Liberal’s Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1996).
223. For example, some jurisdictions with both extensive non-conforming immigrant communities
and the political will and resources to work to reconcile those practices with broader community norms
and applicable law have incorporated sensitivity to cultural difference in their CPS protocols and have
trained their professionals accordingly. On the other hand, jurisdictions that are unaccustomed to nonconforming immigrants or are unwilling to work to understand their different practices have not
engaged such efforts.
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breadth and vagueness of typical child-abuse definitions, the listed behaviors do
not necessarily correspond with harm or functional impairment. For example, a
parent’s choice to hit a child on the face or to put pepper in a child’s mouth
might trigger scrutiny and even substantiation according to an illustrative list in
a particular state or county,224 but may not result in harm if other criteria such as
severity or chronicity are absent. Illustrative lists may thus cause a mixed bag of
outcomes that are good—increasing predictability and consistency—and bad—
intervention in the family that is unnecessary to protect a child from harm.
Because they do some important good, however, and because their contents
often reflect nonnormative parenting, either in fact or aspirationally, we do not
suggest that they be eliminated. Rather, we encourage their treatment as
potentially contributing to rather than as automatically dispositive of the line
between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse.
5. Evidence
Standard evidence law applicable to judicial proceedings provides that “all
relevant evidence is admissible”; “relevant evidence” means “evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.”225 This law further provides that
if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
226
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Although the line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse is
drawn initially by CPS and only sometimes and subsequently in a judicial
proceeding, the practice required by and principles underlying these rules ought
to apply throughout the process. Both CPS and the courts ought to consider all

224. See Stephen D. Whitney et al., Defining Child Abuse: Exploring Variations in Ratings of
Discipline Severity Among Child Welfare Practitioners, 23 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 316,
323 (2006) (including these practices or behaviors as among those most likely to trigger CPS scrutiny);
interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor,
Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP) (noting that its agency’s protocol requires a
finding of abuse when a parent seeks to corporally punish a child anywhere on the head).
225. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 402. The states’ own rules mirror the Federal Rules in these respects.
See, e.g., ALA. R. EVID. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”); ALA. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or that of the State of
Alabama, by statute, by these rules, or by other rules applicable in the courts of this State. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.”). None of the standard exceptions to this rule apply to exclude
consideration of the scientific and other evidence described in this article.
226. FED. R. EVID. 702. The states’ rules on expert testimony are similar. See, e.g., ALA. R. EVID.
702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”).
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relevant evidence as they make findings in individual cases, including but not
limited to reliable scientific evidence.
The line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse is not fixed or
easily identified, particularly in cases at the margins. No scientific or case
evidence can identify with absolute accuracy the precise point at which corporal
punishment becomes abuse. Nevertheless, more consistent and accurate results
can be achieved if CPS and the courts have access to, understand, and use as
much relevant and reliable evidence as possible. This evidence includes
empirical findings about community norms and practices from both lay
witnesses and survey experts, as well as scientific evidence that describes the
contexts that cause children to suffer functional impairments.227 This evidence
should be used to evaluate both the reasonableness of discipline and the
reasonableness of the force used—in other words, to evaluate the merits of both
prongs of the corporal-punishment standard. Thus, in order to fulfill their
professional obligations, case workers, prosecutors, and judges should be
regularly educated about the status of scientific evidence in child abuse and be
trained to interpret that evidence.
CPS appears in general to be much more comfortable than the courts with a
variety of evidence, including with scientific evidence. What is not clear, though,
is whether those agencies and professionals that incorporate emotional and
developmental consequences into their assessments are using only valid
scientific evidence about those consequences. At least some case workers
appear to be using a combination of valid evidence, intuition, or presumed
knowledge about the nonphysical sequelae of physical injuries. In addition, in
their eagerness to help children exposed to what they perceive to be suboptimal
conditions, at least some workers appear willing to classify as abuse incidents
and injuries that have not or are unlikely to cause functional impairment.
Considering emotional and developmental consequences is essential to the

227. Part III.B elaborates on the contexts that cause children to suffer functional impairments.
Evidence of the presence of these contexts is thus relevant to establishing child abuse. Discerning
functional impairment is easiest in circumstances where children are old enough to express their
concerns, or else to exhibit failures or inabilities in the exercise of their daily activities. It is more
difficult in circumstances where children are either chronologically or developmentally younger,
because how well they are functioning in their daily lives is much less susceptible to lay observation. It
is thus essential that valid expertise be brought to bear on both the actual and probabilistic effects of
parental behavior in infants and toddlers. Thus, for example, immediate functional impairment could
be assessed by a medical or psychological examination of the child’s current status. Future functional
impairment is (in all contexts) an estimate that has a probability attached to it, for example: highly
likely, somewhat likely, unlikely to be impaired in a domain such as academic, mental health, or daily
living. This probability is based on matching the parent’s behavior and child’s current status with a
scientific literature that says “if the parent’s behavior is x and the child’s current status is y, then the
likelihood is z that the child will be impaired in the future.” Although probabilistic evaluations are, by
definition, less certain and thus more likely than current status to result in errors, they are necessary
unless society is willing to forgo interventions in the family to protect children who are (merely) at risk
of maltreatment. Assuming that society is not willing to forego such interventions, it is better—errors
will be reduced—if this evaluation is based or substantially relies on valid scientific evidence. Currently,
there is no such requirement.
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analysis, but it is also essential that these consequences be legitimate and
serious. CPS ought to be required to use only that evidence from laypersons
and experts that meets rigorous validity standards.
Courts appear less likely than CPS to be comfortable with scientific
evidence that is not related to the medical facts surrounding a particular
physical injury. In particular, courts and the lawyers practicing before them
sometimes appear uninterested in or uncomfortable with scientific evidence
about nonphysical sequelae. To some extent this discomfort is due to the
exclusive focus of statutory abuse definitions—either in plain text or as
interpreted by other courts in the jurisdiction—on the child’s physical injuries.
Separately, however, it appears that judges and lawyers do not know what to
make of CPS’s claims about emotional and developmental evidence. This
uncertainty may be based on their sense that this evidence lacks the indicia of
validity necessary in judicial proceedings, or because the law traditionally
struggles with claims about emotional damage, both inside and outside of the
maltreatment context.228 Whatever the case, requiring relevance and validity
consistent with the rules of evidence, and making clear the doctrinal contexts in
which the evidence is to be presented, is essential to its acceptability and utility
for these legal actors.
The requirement that practitioners, lawyers, and courts use valid scientific
evidence to decide whether cases involve reasonable corporal punishment or
abuse necessarily implicates the need for experts to be part of the process. This,
in turn, raises the question whether our approach is realistic given the system’s
already-limited human and financial resources. We acknowledge that scientific
expertise is not free and thus that our proposal will introduce new costs into the
system. At the same time, we suggest that these costs are worth bearing if they
can fix the problems inherent in the current process, specifically its tendency to
produce inconsistent and erroneous outcomes. Like other evidence, once
certain scientific facts are accepted and established, they will be admissible or
judicially noticed without the involvement of costly experts, thus ensuring that
whatever costs are added are reduced over time. Moreover, adoption of this
proposal should result in some cost savings—for example, by forcing CPS to
concentrate its resources more narrowly on the cases involving functional
impairment—that will offset some if not all of the cost increases. In other
words, we believe that our approach is both necessary and realistic, the latter
particularly if policymakers are willing to view the additional costs in their
broader context.
228. Although the law today generally recognizes claims for emotional harm, its traditional concerns
about frivolous and fraudulent claims and about how to limit liability in such a way that the outcome is
fair also to the defendant continue to affect their viability and usefulness. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §
7B-101(1)(e) (2007) (providing that an “[a]bused juvenile” includes a child “whose parent, guardian,
custodian, or caretaker . . . [c]reates or allows to be created serious emotional damage to the juvenile”
which “is evidenced by a juvenile’s severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or aggressive behavior
toward himself or others”) (emphasis added); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978)
(making these points about the need to limit the scope of civil claims for emotional-distress damages).
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6. Model Corporal-Punishment Provision
The following model corporal-punishment provision is based on the
structure and principles articulated above. It is designed to be used in the civil
child-maltreatment context. However, with some modification, its terms may
also be applicable to criminal maltreatment investigations and proceedings.
Because it substantially mirrors the common-law tort standard and is otherwise
consistent with standard evidence law, it also can be applied in that setting.
Although these three areas of law have some different objectives and concerns,
there is merit to a jurisdiction’s considering adoption of a single unified rule, as
doing so would send a consistent message to the relevant legal actors—
including parents, CPS, and judges—about the state’s position on corporal
punishment. This single rule, in turn, would potentially reduce the number of
incidents in which children were injured in the disciplinary setting and,
correspondingly, the number of interventions by the state in the family.
Model Corporal-Punishment Provision
1. A nonaccidental physical assault on a child is child abuse unless it is privileged or
excused.
2. Privileges and Excuses
A. The Privilege of Reasonable Corporal Punishment. A parent is privileged to
use physical force to discipline his or her child so long as
(i) he or she is reasonable in determining that the child’s behavior
warranted discipline, and
(ii) the force used is reasonable in nature and moderate in degree. Force is
reasonable in nature and moderate in degree if it does not cause or risk
causing functional impairment. Functional impairment means short- or
long-term or permanent impairment of physical or emotional functioning
in tasks of daily living.
B. The “De Minimis” Exception. A parent who does not have a reasonable
disciplinary motive for his or her conduct but who does not cause his or her child
more than minimal harm will not be charged with child abuse.
3. Burden of Proof. A parent charged with assaulting his or her child bears the burden
of asserting and producing some evidence to support the assertion that the assault was
privileged or excused. When a parent meets this burden, the state is required to prove
that the assault was not privileged or excused.
4. Evidence
A. Any evidence is admissible and should be considered in the evaluation of
individual cases that is relevant to establishing that
(i) an assault occurred or did not occur;
(ii) discipline was or was not appropriate in the circumstances;
(iii) the force used was or was not reasonable in the circumstances; and/or
(iv) any harm caused to the child was or was not within the de minimis
exception.
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B. Relevant evidence includes, among other things, evidence of traditional
parenting practices and scientific evidence (both medical and social-science
evidence) that is proffered to provide assistance to the court in understanding
the effects of discipline and force in the circumstances.

IV
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding efforts in some states to narrow their scope, legal
definitions of abuse and neglect continue in general to be broad and vague.
Among other things, this means that the line between reasonable corporal
punishment and abuse itself tends to be ill-defined. This ambiguity has been
rationalized primarily on the ground that the state needs flexible definitions to
ensure that it can act to protect children from maltreatment in whatever form it
may appear.
Although flexibility is certainly a valid concern, an important ancillary effect
is that this ill-defined standard abdicates to the relevant legal actors—parents,
reporters, CPS professionals, and the courts—the job of defining maltreatment,
and thus also the boundaries of reasonable corporal punishment. Not
surprisingly, each of these definers is constrained differently, if not by formal
rules, then by cultural, political, religious, and professional training. Parents and
lay reporters typically operate on a “know it when you see it” basis, whereas
CPS professionals and courts are somewhat, but not ever entirely, constrained
in this exercise by the norms of their respective disciplines, social work, and law.
Thus, current law fails to give useful guidance to its intended audience, and it
provides for inconsistent case outcomes and an unacceptable risk of both falsepositive and false-negative errors.
The line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse will never be
exact. But the states can do a much better job of constraining decisionmakers to
ensure both that they are only targeting parental behaviors and outcomes for
the child that justify intrusions on family privacy, and that these circumstances
are consistent and publicly accessible. To these ends, this article contributes to
the literature on the subject of broad and vague abuse definitions in law and the
social sciences by proposing a legislative solution to the problem of where and
how to draw the line between reasonable corporal punishment and
maltreatment that is grounded in long-standing parental-autonomy norms and
informed by the science that teaches when and how children suffer harm.
Specifically, it proposes the adoption of a standard for reasonable corporal
punishment that requires both a reasonable disciplinary motive and reasonable
force, and it defines reasonableness according to both normative
understandings and scientific evidence of capacity and functional impairment.
As a theoretical matter, this standard reflects appropriate recognition of the
societal significance of parental rights and responsibilities and permits
intervention in the family only when there is evidence of important physical,
emotional, or developmental harm to the child. And as a practical matter, it
continues to provide the state with the flexibility necessary to target even
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unusual forms of maltreatment, while simultaneously clarifying the
circumstances that will and should trigger state action. This, in turn, should
result in more consistent case outcomes as well as fewer false-positive and falsenegative findings of maltreatment.

